Law Commons^™

Command And Control: Operationalizing The Unitary Executive, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The concept of the unitary executive is written into the Constitution by virtue of Article II’s vesting of the “executive Power” in the President and not in executive officers created by Congress. Defenders and opponents alike of the “unitary executive” often equate the idea of presidential control of executive action with the power to remove executive personnel. But an unlimitable presidential removal power cannot be derived from the vesting of executive power in the President for the simple reason that it would not actually result in full presidential control of executive action, as the actions of now-fired subordinates would still …

Movement On Removal: An Emerging Consensus On The First Congress, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

What did the “Decision of 1789” decide about presidential removal power, if anything? It turns out that an emerging consensus of scholars agrees that there was not much consensus in the First Congress.

Two more questions follow: Is the “unitary executive theory” based on originalism, and if so, is originalism a reliable method of interpretation based on historical evidence?

The unitary executive theory posits that a president has exclusive and “indefeasible” executive powers (i.e., powers beyond congressional and judicial checks and balances). This panel was an opportunity for unitary executive theorists and their critics to debate recent historical research questioning …

Major Questions About Presidentialism: Untangling The “Chain Of Dependence” Across Administrative Law, Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Jodi L. Short

Faculty Scholarship

A contradiction about the role of the president has emerged between the Roberts Court’s Article II jurisprudence and its Major Questions Doctrine jurisprudence. In its appointment and removal decisions, the Roberts Court claims that the president is the “most democratic and politically accountable official in Government” because the president is “directly accountable to the people through regular elections,” an audacious new interpretation of Article II; and it argues that tight presidential control of agency officials lends democratic legitimacy to the administrative state. We identify these twin arguments about the “directly accountable president” and the “chain of dependence” as the foundation …

Major Questions And An Emergency Question Doctrine: The Biden Student Debt Case Study Of Pretextual Abuse Of Emergency Powers, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

The major question doctrine tries to address one problem, the Imperial Executive, by escalating another, the Imperial Judiciary. This article proposes a solution, with the Biden Student Debt Waiver as a case study: An “emergency question” doctrine.

This emergency questions doctrine would apply when the executive relies on a statutory emergency clause or invokes an emergency in its application of a statutory provision. As a matter of statutory interpretation, the emergency question doctrine would follow the two most important steps of the major question approach: 1) relying on purpose and context to clarify and limit the scope of open-ended emergency …

Biden V. Nebraska: The New State Standing And The (Old) Purposive Major Questions Doctrine, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion in Biden v. Nebraska does not sufficiently explain how Missouri has standing under established Article III doctrine, nor how the Court approaches the major questions doctrine as a method of statutory interpretation. Clarification can come from other opinions, even other cases entirely, in which Justice’s counterarguments are suggestive of the real arguments underlying the decisions.

MOHELA may have faced a concrete injury from the student debt waiver, but there was no evidence that Missouri would – and the majority had no answer for how Missouri had standing without an injury. A debate over special state …

January 6, Ambiguously Inciting Speech, And The Overt-Acts Rule, Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

A prosecution of Donald Trump for his role in the January 6 attack on the Capitol would have to address whether the First Amendment protects the inflammatory remarks he made at the “Stop the Steal” rally. A prosecution based solely on the content of Trump’s speech—whether for incitement, insurrection, or obstruction—would face serious constitutional difficulties under Brandenburg v. Ohio’s dual requirements of intent and likely imminence. But a prosecution need not rely solely on the content of Trump’s speech. It can also look to Trump’s actions: his order to the remove the magnetometers from the entrances to the rally and …

The Electoral Count Mess: The Electoral Count Act Of 1887 Is Unconstitutional, And Other Fun Facts (Plus A Few Random Academic Speculations) About Counting Electoral Votes, Jack M. Beermann, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

In this essay, and in light of the controversy that arose in the wake of the 2020 presidential election, we explain the constitutional process for counting electoral votes. In short, every four years, the Twelfth Amendment requires the President of the Senate (usually the Vice President of the United States) to open certificates provided by state presidential electors and count the votes contained therein. The Constitution allows no role for Congress in this process, and thus the provisions of the Electoral Count Act purporting to grant Congress the power, by concurrent resolution, to reject a state's electoral votes are unconstitutional. …

The Place Of The Presidency In Historical Time, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay arises from a symposium based on Jack Balkin’s book, The Cycles of Constitutional Time, which argues that America’s constitutional development is marked by patterns of decline and renewal. I contend that the presidency today has become endowed with outsized expectations borne of popular frustrations with a centuries-old document that is desperately in need of updating. As a result, Presidents enjoy imbalanced and dangerous power to initiate legal reform or stymie it. Going forward, three dynamics are worth watching. First, noisy signals coming from performative transformation can obscure the true source and scope of legal changes initiated by a …

When Protest Is The Disaster: Constitutional Implications Of State And Local Emergency Power, Karen Pita Loor

Faculty Scholarship

The President’s use of emergency authority has recently ignited concern among civil rights groups over national executive emergency power. However, state and local emergency authority can also be dangerous and deserves similar attention. This article demonstrates that, just as we watch over the national executive, we must be wary of and check on state and local executives — and their emergency management law enforcement actors — when they react in crisis mode. This paper exposes and critiques state executives’ use of emergency power and emergency management mechanisms to suppress grassroots political activity and suggests avenues to counter that abuse. I …

Congressional Administration Of Foreign Affairs, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Longstanding debates over the allocation of foreign affairs power between Congress and the President have reached a stalemate. Wherever the formal line between Congress and the President’s powers is drawn, it is well established that as a functional matter, even in times of great discord between the two branches, the President wields immense power when he acts in the name of foreign policy or national security.

And yet, while scholarship focuses on the accretion of power in the presidency, presidential primacy is not the end of the story. The fact that the President usually “wins” in foreign affairs does not …

The Sanctuary Of Prosecutorial Nullification, Zohra Ahmed

Faculty Scholarship

In the aftermath of the 2016 election, the shortcomings of existing sanctuary protections came sharply into focus.¹ Historically, cities enacted sanctuary protections to extricate their law enforcement agencies from activities related to federal immigration enforcement. In sanctuary cities, local government agencies are typically restricted from sharing information with federal immigration authorities or from cooperating in apprehending individuals targeted for removal. ² After the White House issued an Executive Order (EO) in late January 2017, many immigrant rights advocates recognized that external facing policies that proscribed direct cooperation would not suffice. ³ The EO announced that Immigration and Customs Enforcement …

Immigration Unilateralism And American Ethnonationalism, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This paper arose from an invited symposium on "Democracy in America: The Promise and the Perils," held at Loyola University Chicago School of Law in Spring 2019. The essay places the Trump administration’s immigration and refugee policy in the context of a resurgent ethnonationalist movement in America as well as the constitutional politics of the past. In particular, it argues that Trumpism’s suspicion of foreigners who are Hispanic or Muslim, its move toward indefinite detention and separation of families, and its disdain for so-called “chain migration” are best understood as part of an assault on the political settlement of the …

Bureaucratic Resistance And The National Security State, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Modern accounts of the national security state tend toward one of two opposing views of bureaucratic tensions within it: At one extreme, the executive branch bureaucracy is a shadowy “deep state,” unaccountable to the public or even to the elected President. On this account, bureaucratic obstacles to the President’s agenda are inherently suspect, even dangerous. At the other end, bureaucratic resistance to the President represents a necessary benevolent constraint on an otherwise imperial executive, the modern incarnation of the separation of powers, as the traditional checks on the President of the courts and Congress have fallen down on the job. …

Testimony Of Rebecca Ingber Before The United States Senate Committee On The Judiciary On The Nomination Of Brett Kavanaugh For Associate Justice Of The U.S. Supreme Court, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Professor Rebecca Ingber testified before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee as it considered the nomination of Brett Kavanaugh for Associate Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Her testimony focused on Judge Kavanaugh's national security and international law jurisprudence, in particular, the court's role in considering international law constraints on the President's war powers, and the potential effects of this judicial approach on executive power.

Barack Obama's Emancipation Proclamation: An Essay In Memory Of Judge Richard D. Cudahy, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In a case involving whether illegal immigrants were protected under federal labor law, Judge Richard Cudahy, observed that illegal immigrants are often at the mercy of unscrupulous employers and that immigrations laws provide employers “with a powerful tool for unfair and oppressive treatment of migrant labor.” There are millions of people in the United States who are vulnerable to exploitation in the workplace due to their illegal immigration status. In 2012 and 2014, the Obama administration announced programs designed to provide limited security to some of the millions of illegal immigrants present in the United States. These programs are, in …

Obama's Conversion On Same-Sex Marriage: The Social Foundations Of Individual Rights, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

This essay explores how presidents who wish to seize a leadership role over the development of rights must tend to the social foundations of those rights. Broad cultural changes alone do not guarantee success, nor do they dictate the substance of constitutional ideas. Rather, presidential aides must actively re-characterize the social conditions in which rights are made, disseminated, and enforced. An administration must articulate a strategically plausible theory of a particular right, ensure there is cultural and institutional support for that right, and work to minimize blowback. Executive branch officials must seek to transform and popularize legal concepts while working …

Representative/Senator Trump?, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The American presidency is a much more powerful office in 2017 than was contemplated by the Constitution of 1788. In large measure, that is because Congress has unconstitutionally subdelegated many of its legislative powers to the President. The President thus effectively functions as the Congress to a significant degree, which not only perverts the constitutional structure but also significantly raises the stakes of presidential elections. There is no good reason to expect Congress or the courts to stem the tide of subdelegation. Presidents, however, have a number of tools available to resist, and even reverse, that tide. While there is …

Co-Belligerency, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Executive branch officials rest the President’s authority in today’s war against ISIS, al Qaeda, and other terrorist groups on an expansive interpretation of a 15-year-old statute, the 2001 “Authorization for Use of Military Force” (AUMF), passed in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. They rely on that statute to justify force against groups neither referenced in – nor even in existence at the time of – the 2001 statute, by invoking a creative theory of international law they call “co-belligerency.” Under this theory, the President can read his AUMF authority flexibly, to justify force against not only those groups covered …

The Obama War Powers Legacy And The Internal Forces That Entrench Executive Power, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

In exploring the Obama war powers legacy, this essay examines the systemic forces inside the executive branch that influence modern presidential decision-making and, barring a total reimagining of the executive branch, will operate on administrations to come. These mechanisms and norms fall broadly within two categories: (1) features that favor continuity and hinder presidents from effecting change, including both novel assertions of executive power and attempts to dial back that power; and (2) features that incrementally aggrandize such power claims. Together, these two sets of forces operate as a one-way ratchet, slowly expanding and ultimately entrenching executive branch power.

International Law Constraints As Executive Power, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

The use of international law to understand domestic authority has a long pedigree. It is also the subject of heated debate, which focuses predominantly on the extent to which international law can or should serve as a limit on political actors, in particular the President, and the extent to which it can be invoked to expand our understanding of domestic individual rights. Yet there is another significant dynamic at work in this interplay between international and domestic law. This is the invocation of international law not as a constraining force on government actors, but as an enabling force within the …

The Dependent Origins Of Independent Agencies: The Interstate Commerce Commission, The Tenure Of Office Act, And The Rise Of Modern Campaign Finance, Jed Handelsman Shugerman

Faculty Scholarship

Independent regulatory agencies are some of the most powerful institutions in the United States, and we think of them today as designed to be insulated from political control. This Article shows that their origins were the opposite: this model first emerged in the late nineteenth century because it offered more political control.

The modern executive's design of unitary presidential control over most offices, alongside "independent" regulatory agencies, took shape in the winter of 1886-1887. Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act, giving the President the unchecked power to dismiss principal officers and ending the Senate's power to protect those officers. …

Interpretation Catalysts And Executive Branch Legal Decisionmaking, Rebecca Ingber

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have seen much speculation over executive branch legal interpretation and internal decisionmaking, particularly in matters of national security and international law. Debate persists over how and why the executive arrives at particular understandings of its legal constraints, the extent to which the positions taken by one presidential administration may bind the next, and, indeed, the extent to which the President is constrained by law at all. Current scholarship focuses on rational, political, and structural arguments to explain executive actions and legal positioning, but it has yet to take account of the diverse ways in which legal questions arise …

Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

There is a documented increase in the volume of regulatory activity during the last 90 days of presidential administrations. The phenomenon of late-term regulatory activity has been called “Midnight Regulation” based on a comparison to the Cinderella story in which the magic wears off at the stroke of midnight. This Report, prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States, looks closely at one species of Midnight Regulation, namely Midnight Rules, promulgated in the last 90 days of an administration. The Report examines the phenomenon and concludes with recommendations adopted by the Administrative Conference of the United States at its …

A Skeptical View Of A Skeptical View Of Presidential Term Limits, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Dean Jeremy Paul is concerned that the presidency has been weakened and that the Twenty-Second Amendment’s limitation on presidential service is at least partly to blame. Dean Paul is clearly correct that once a President reaches the point beyond which re-election is not constitutionally possible, the President is effectively a lame duck. Dean Paul further points out that since 1951 when the amendment limiting Presidents to two terms went into effect, there have been several instances of very poor results in the President’s second term. He attributes the second term problems of some recent Presidents at least partly to term …

Midnight Deregulation, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

Research has revealed a significant increase in regulatory activity in the last quarter of the final year of U.S. presidential administrations, with a great deal of regulatory activity occurring in the period between the election and the inauguration of the new president. Despite the expressed intent to minimize midnight regulation, the volume of regulatory activity at the end of the administration of George W. Bush spiked in a magnitude similar to that of other recent transitions. There was, however a difference. While the end of the administrations of Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton exhibited the issuance of new regulations that …

What Lurks Beneath: Nsa Surveillance And Executive Power Symposium: The Role Of The President In The Twenty-First Century, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

It is not surprising that, nearly two and a quarter centuries after ratification of the Federal Constitution, people are still actively arguing about the extent of the American President's powers.' The concept of executive power is notoriously murky,2 so disputes about its scope and character are virtually unavoidable. It is, however, at least a tad surprising that, nearly two and a quarter centuries after ratification of the Federal Constitution, people are still arguing about the constitutional sources of presidential power. 3 It is one thing to disagree about how far the President's power extends, but it is quite another thing …

The Scope Of Executive Power In The Twenty-First Century: An Introduction, Robert D. Sloane

Faculty Scholarship

This is a revised version of introductory remarks to a panel entitled The Scope of Executive Power held on October 12, 2007, at Boston University Law School's symposium, The Role of the President in the 21st Century. It focuses on an argument advanced by Charlie Savage, among others: that the Bush administration has forged a breathtakingly robust view of the scope of executive power by combining (1) the original Unitary Executive thesis, which insists on the "exclusivity" of certain plenary presidential powers; with (2) a new Unitary Executive thesis, which insists on a vastly expanded vision of the "scope" of …

Reconsidering Gobitis: An Exercise In Presidential Leadership, Robert L. Tsai

Faculty Scholarship

In June of 1940, the Supreme Court ruled 8-1 in Minersville School District v. Gobitis that the First Amendment posed no barrier to the punishment of two school age Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to pay homage to the American flag. Three years later, the Justices reversed themselves in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette. This sudden change has prompted a host of explanations. Some observers have stressed changes in judicial personnel in the intervening years; others have pointed to the wax and wane of general anxieties over the war; still others have emphasized the sympathy-inspiring acts of …

Ordinary Powers In Extraordinary Times: Common Sense In Times Of Crisis Symposium: Extraordinary Powers In Ordinary Times, Gary S. Lawson

Faculty Scholarship

The U.S. Constitution was written, debated, ratified, and implemented in the shadow of crisis. The country was birthed in war. In the aftermath of ratification, opponents of the Constitution could have precipitated a civil war that would have jeopardized the survival of the fledgling national government. I Throughout the founding era, any number of European powers were perceived to pose a serious threat of invasion. 2 Well into the 1800s, especially in certain northeastern states, substantial homegrown support for realignment with England persisted; the possibility of an internal rebellion in those areas was quite real.3 Individuals interested more in power …

Congressional Administration, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In recent years, at least since President Reagan's precedent-setting Executive Order 12291, the phenomenon of direct presidential supervision of agencies has received significant attention in legal scholarship. Congress's involvement has been much less thoroughly examined, and, although most people are familiar with congressional hearings and oversight, the dominant image as a legal matter is that once Congress legislates, it loses control over how its laws are administered unless it chooses to legislate again. In the political science/public policy literature, the understanding of Congress's role in monitoring agencies has evolved from despair that Congress is not sufficiently engaged to a recognition …