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Full-Text Articles in Law

Retuning The Harmonization Of Eu Asylum Law: Exploring The Need For An Eu Asylum Appellate Court, Ariel Meyerstein Oct 2005

Retuning The Harmonization Of Eu Asylum Law: Exploring The Need For An Eu Asylum Appellate Court, Ariel Meyerstein

Ariel Meyerstein, JD, PhD

This Comment takes as its starting point the adoption of the first five pieces of harmonized legislation created as part of the EU’s asylum regime overhaul of the early 2000s and proposes constructive solutions to compensate for the inadequate results of the May 2004 negotiations in Brussels. Specifically, it is proposed that an EU-wide asylum appellate court could assist the Member States in completing the work they started by creating a comprehensive harmonization consistent with international law.


Agenda Setting, Issue Priorities, And Organizational Maintenance: The U.S. Supreme Court, 1955 To 1994, Jeff L. Yates, Andrew B. Whitford, William Gillespie Jan 2005

Agenda Setting, Issue Priorities, And Organizational Maintenance: The U.S. Supreme Court, 1955 To 1994, Jeff L. Yates, Andrew B. Whitford, William Gillespie

Jeff L Yates

In this study, we examine agenda setting by the U.S. Supreme Court, and ask the question of why the Court allocates more or less of its valuable agenda space to one policy issue over others. Our study environment is the policy issue composition of the Court's docket: the Court's attention to criminal justice policy issues relative to other issues. We model the Court's allocation of this agenda space as a function of internal organizational demands and external political signals. We find that this agenda responds to the issue priorities of the other branches of the federal government and the public. …


Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate, And The Prisoner's Dilemma, David S. Law Jan 2005

Appointing Federal Judges: The President, The Senate, And The Prisoner's Dilemma, David S. Law

David S. Law

This article argues that the expansion of the White House's role in judicial appointments since the late 1970s, at the expense of the Senate, has contributed to heightened levels of ideological conflict and gridlock over the appointment of federal appeals court judges, by making a cooperative equilibrium difficult to sustain. Presidents have greater electoral incentive to behave ideologically, and less incentive to cooperate with other players in the appointments process, than do senators, who are disciplined to a greater extent in their dealings with each other by the prospect of retaliation over repeat play. The possibility of divided government exacerbates …