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Full-Text Articles in Law
The Eu, Democracy And Institutional Structure: Past, Present And Future, Paul Craig
The Eu, Democracy And Institutional Structure: Past, Present And Future, Paul Craig
Articles by Maurer Faculty
No abstract provided.
محاسن دستور مكتوب من وراء ستار الجهل, Ahmed Souaiaia
محاسن دستور مكتوب من وراء ستار الجهل, Ahmed Souaiaia
Ahmed E SOUAIAIA
No abstract provided.
Does The Constitutional Process Matter?, Zachary Elkins
Does The Constitutional Process Matter?, Zachary Elkins
Zachary Elkins
Constitution-making is a ubiquitous but poorly understood phenomenon. There is much speculation but relatively little evidence about the impact of different design processes on constitutional outcomes. Much of the debate reduces to the question of who is involved in the process and when. We consider two central issues in this regard. The first is the problem of institutional self-dealing, or whether governmental organs that have something to gain from the constitutional outcome should be involved in the process. The second has to do with the merits of public involvement in the process. Both of these concerns have clear normative implications …
Constitution-Making: A Process Filled With Constraint, Donald L. Horowitz
Constitution-Making: A Process Filled With Constraint, Donald L. Horowitz
Faculty Scholarship
Constitutions are generally made by people with no previous experience in constitution making. The assistance they receive from outsiders is often less useful than it may appear. The most pertinent foreign experience may reside in distant countries, whose lessons are unknown or inaccessible. Moreover, although constitutions are intended to endure, they are often products of the particular crisis that forced their creation. Drafters are usually heavily affected by a desire to avoid repeating unpleasant historical experiences or to emulate what seem to be successful constitutional models. Theirs is a heavily constrained environment, made even more so by distrust and dissensus …
Constitutional Design And Law: The Political Economy Of Cabinet And Congressional Government, Matthew S. R. Palmer
Constitutional Design And Law: The Political Economy Of Cabinet And Congressional Government, Matthew S. R. Palmer
The Hon Justice Matthew Palmer
The dissertation takes a political economy approach to constitutional design and legislation in the Westminster (Cabinet) and US (Congressional) models of government. Part I develops the economics of comparative political organization by constructing a theoretical framework for analyzing constitutional design. Part II applies the framework to distinguish the essences of the Cabinet and Congressional systems of constitutional design in the contexts of US and Canadian federal government. Part III analyzes the effects of the different constitutional designs on the processes of legislating in each system and on the substantive characteristics of legislation in each system. The analysis is subjected to …