Law Commons^™

Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …

Ireland And Iceland In Crisis C: Iceland’S Landsbanki Icesave, Arwin G. Zeissler, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

At year-end 2005, almost all of the total assets of Iceland’s banking system were concentrated in just three banks (Glitnir, Kaupthing, and Landsbanki). These banks were criticized by certain financial analysts in early 2006 for being overly dependent on wholesale funding, much of it short-term, that could easily disappear if creditors’ confidence in these banks faltered for any reason. Landsbanki, followed later by Kaupthing and then Glitnir, responded to this criticism and replaced part of their wholesale funding by using online accounts to gather deposits from individuals across Europe. In Landsbanki’s case, these new deposits were marketed under the name …

The ‘Security Pacific Letter’: Estimating The Causal Effect Of Securitization On Banks’ Systemic Exposure, Paul-Angelo Dell'isola

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs

This paper aims to test the hypothesis of the ‘Safe Asset narrative’

which states that banks became manufacturers of pseudo safe assets to meet

a global shortage of safe assets in the pre-crisis period. In this narrative,

securitization is the mechanism which enables banks to become underwriters

of safe assets. This paper takes this hypothesis to the data and attempts to

estimate the causal effect of securitization on banks’ systemic exposure. In

particular, this paper exploits a regulatory change that occurred in 1987 when

the OCC expanded the scope of assets US national banks could securitize. By

using state-chartered banks …