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Full-Text Articles in Law

Legal Personhood For Artificial Intelligence, Tyler Jaynes Jun 2019

Legal Personhood For Artificial Intelligence, Tyler Jaynes

Tyler Jaynes

The concept of artificial intelligence is not new nor is the notion that it should be granted legal protections given its influence on human activity. What is new, on a relative scale, is the notion that artificial intelligence can possess citizenship—a concept reserved only for humans, as it presupposes the idea of possessing civil duties and protections. Where there are several decades’ worth of writing on the concept of the legal status of computational artificial artefacts in the USA and elsewhere, it is surprising that law makers internationally have come to a standstill to protect our silicon brainchildren. In this …


Poverty Knowledge, Coercion, And Social Rights: A Discourse Ethical Contribution To Social Epistemology, David Ingram Oct 2013

Poverty Knowledge, Coercion, And Social Rights: A Discourse Ethical Contribution To Social Epistemology, David Ingram

David Ingram

In today’s America the persistence of crushing poverty in the midst of staggering affluence no longer incites the righteous jeremiads it once did. Resigned acceptance of this paradox is fueled by a sense that poverty lies beyond the moral and technical scope of government remediation. The failure of experts to reach agreement on the causes of poverty merely exacerbates our despair. Are the causes internal to the poor – reflecting their more or less voluntary choices? Or do they emanate from structures beyond their control (but perhaps amenable to government remediation)? If both of these explanations are true (as I …


Diabolical Frivolity Of Neoliberal Fundamentalism, Sefik Tatlic Jan 2009

Diabolical Frivolity Of Neoliberal Fundamentalism, Sefik Tatlic

Sefik Tatlic

Today, we cannot talk just about plain control, but we must talk about the nature of the interaction of the one who is being controlled and the one who controls, an interaction where the one that is “controlled” is asking for more control over himself/herself while expecting to be compensated by a surplus of freedom to satisfy trivial needs and wishes. Such a liberty for the fulfillment of trivial needs is being declared as freedom. But this implies as well the freedom to choose not to be engaged in any kind of socially sensible or politically articulated struggle.


L’Unité De La Justification À L’Épreuve De La Justification Juridique [Justificatory Unification And Legal Justification], Mathilde Cohen Dec 2008

L’Unité De La Justification À L’Épreuve De La Justification Juridique [Justificatory Unification And Legal Justification], Mathilde Cohen

Mathilde Cohen

This paper asks whether the notion of justification can play a unifying role comparable to that of explanation for the sciences. It argues that legal justification poses a challenge to the project of unifying sciences on the basis of justification. To be sure, lawyers import methodological requirements typical of scientific discourse into the law. In particular, following the Aristotelian doctrine of the syllogism and compelled by the popularity of the Deductive-Nomological models of explanation in the 20th century, they often claim to be using a deductivist conception of justification. In practice, however, the justification of legal decisions violates this conception …


The Five Levels Of Inventions- A Classification Of Patents From Triz Perspective, Umakant Mishra Jan 2006

The Five Levels Of Inventions- A Classification Of Patents From Triz Perspective, Umakant Mishra

Umakant Mishra

The Five levels of Inventions is a popular concept in the study of TRIZ. Generally patent databases (like USPTO) classify inventions according to their topics or areas of invention. But they don’t classify inventions according to their easiness or usefulness or inventiveness. Altshuller classified patents into five levels according to their levels of inventiveness. The higher levels of inventions are difficult (and rare) while the lower levels of inventions are easy and plenty in number. This article attempts to explain the five levels of inventions in simple terms and the purpose behind such a classification. Although there are limitations and …


In Defence Of Exploitation, Justin Schwartz Jan 1995

In Defence Of Exploitation, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

The concept of exploitation is thought to be central to Marx's Critique of capitalism. John Roemer, an analytical (then-) Marxist economist now at Yale, attacked this idea in a series of papers and books in the 1970s-1990s, arguing that Marxists should be concerned with inequality rather than exploitation -- with distribution rather than production, precisely the opposite of what Marx urged in The Critique of the Gotha Progam.

This paper expounds and criticizes Roemer's objections and his alternative inequality based theory of exploitation, while accepting some of his criticisms. It may be viewed as a companion paper to my What's …


The Paradox Of Ideology, Justin Schwartz Jan 1993

The Paradox Of Ideology, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

A standard problem with the objectivity of social scientific theory in particular is that it is either self-referential, in which case it seems to undermine itself as ideology, or self-excepting, which seem pragmatically self-refuting. Using the example of Marx and his theory of ideology, I show how self-referential theories that include themselves in their scope of explanation can be objective. Ideology may be roughly defined as belief distorted by class interest. I show how Marx thought that natural science was informed by class interest but not therefore necessarily ideology. Capitalists have an interest in understanding the natural world (to a …


Functional Explanation And Metaphysical Individualism, Justin Schwartz Jan 1993

Functional Explanation And Metaphysical Individualism, Justin Schwartz

Justin Schwartz

A number of (present or former) analytical Marxists, such as Jon Elster, have argued that functional explanation has almost no place in the social sciences. (Although the discussion is framed in terms of a debate among analytical Marxists, the point is quite general, and Marxism is used for illustrative purposes.) Functional explanation accounts for what is to be explained by reference to its function; thus, sighted organism have eyes because eyes enable them to see. Elster and other critics of functional explanation argue that this pattern of explanation is inconsistent with "methodological individualism," the idea, as they understand it, that …