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Full-Text Articles in Law

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2005

Do Institutions Matter? The Impact Of The Lead Plaintiff Provision Of The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, Adam C. Pritchard, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch

Articles

When Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act in 1995 ("PSLRA"), the Act's "lead plaintiff' provision was the centerpiece of its efforts to increase investor control over securities fraud class actions. The lead plaintiff provision alters the balance of power between investors and class counsel by creating a presumption that the investor with the largest financial stake in the case will serve as lead plaintiff. The lead plaintiff then chooses class counsel and, at least in theory, negotiates the terms of counsel's compensation. Congress's stated purpose in enacting the lead plaintiff provision was to encourage institutional ...


A Taxing Settlement, Hanoch Dagan, James J. White Jan 2003

A Taxing Settlement, Hanoch Dagan, James J. White

Articles

The following essay is based on the talk "Government, Citizens, and Injurious Industries: A Case Study of the Tobacco Litigation," delivered by Hanoch Dagan last May to the Detroit Chapter of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, and on the article "Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries," by Dagan and James J. White, '62, which appeared in 75.2 New York University Law Review 254-428 (May 2000). The authors hold conflicting view on the underlying issue of this topic: tobacco company product liability. Professor Dagan holds the position that tobacco companies are liable for harm done by their products ...


Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form Of Collusion In Class Action Settlements, William D. Henderson Jan 2003

Clear Sailing Agreements: A Special Form Of Collusion In Class Action Settlements, William D. Henderson

Articles by Maurer Faculty

A clear sailing agreement (or clause) is a compromise in which a class action defendant agrees not to contest the class lawyer's petition for attorneys' fees. This Article argues that clear sailing provisions often facilitate collusive settlements in cases involving non-pecuniary relief or claims-made common funds that return all unclaimed monies to the defendant. Because these types of settlements present difficult valuation problems, trial courts lack a clear benchmark for calculating attorneys' fees. Defendants and class can exploit this uncertainty by presenting an inflated settlement value to the court (to justify higher attorneys' fees) while simultaneously reducing the true ...


Litigation Realities, Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg Nov 2002

Litigation Realities, Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

After both summarizing recent empirical work and presenting new observations on each of the six phases of a civil lawsuit (forum, pretrial, settlement, trial, judgment, and appeal), the authors draw a series of lessons for understanding and using empirical methods in the study of the legal system's operation. In so doing, they generate implications for current and projected policy debates concerning litigation, while identifying areas that demand further empirical work.


Governments, Citizens, And Injurious Industries, Hanoch Dagan, James J. White Jan 2000

Governments, Citizens, And Injurious Industries, Hanoch Dagan, James J. White

Articles

In this Article, Professors Hanoch Dagan and James White study the most recent challenge raised by mass torts litigation: the interference of governments with the bilateral relationship between citizens and injurious industries. Using the tobacco settlement as their case study, Dagan and White explore the important benefits and the grave dangers of recognizing governments' entitlement to reimbursement for costs they have incurred in preventing or ameliorating their citizens' injuries. They further demonstrate that the current law can help capture these benefits and guard against the entailing risks, showing how subrogation law can serve as the legal foundation of the governments ...


Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, And Why Permit Non-Party Involvement In Settlements?, Leandra Lederman Jan 1999

Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, And Why Permit Non-Party Involvement In Settlements?, Leandra Lederman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical Study Of Predictors Of Failure To Settle, Leandra Lederman Jan 1999

Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical Study Of Predictors Of Failure To Settle, Leandra Lederman

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.


Shareholder Derivative Litigation And Corporate Governance, Mark J. Loewenstein Jan 1999

Shareholder Derivative Litigation And Corporate Governance, Mark J. Loewenstein

Articles

In approving settlements of derivative actions that include fees for plaintiff's attorney, courts typically announce that attorney's fees are approved if a substantial benefit is obtained. In fact, courts, particularly Delaware courts, approve settlements in shareholder derivative actions that included substantial fees for plaintiff's attorney, despite the absence of a corresponding benefit to the corporation. Frequently, the "benefit" obtained is a reform in corporate governance, which is of dubious value to the corporation. To deter frivolous litigation, courts should resist the temptation to approve these settlements just to dispose of the litigation. The paper concludes that fees ...


The Theory Of Fee Regulation In Class Action Settlements , Bruce L. Hay Jun 1997

The Theory Of Fee Regulation In Class Action Settlements , Bruce L. Hay

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.


Why Civil Cases Go To Trial: Strategic Bargaining And The Desire For Vindication, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud Jan 1997

Why Civil Cases Go To Trial: Strategic Bargaining And The Desire For Vindication, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud

Articles

When negotiations break down and a dispute cannot be settled, attorneys commonly blame their adversaries, often questioning their ethics or their judgment. After interviewing many attorneys, we have come to believe much of the criticism is directed at strategic moves in negotiation. But strategic ploys are not the only reason dispute resolution fails. Rather, our research also suggest that a genuine desire for vindication through trial or other formal process may be very significant in some types of cases where bargaining breaks down.


Going To Trial: A Rare Throw Of The Die, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud Jan 1997

Going To Trial: A Rare Throw Of The Die, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud

Articles

If it is true, as we often hear, that we are one of the most litigious societies on earth, it is because of our propensity to sue, not our affinity for trials. Of the hundreds of thousands of civil lawsuits that are filed each year in America, the great majority are settled; of those that are not settled, most are ultimately dismissed by the plaintiffs or by the courts; only a few percent are tried to a jury or a judge. This is no accident. We prefer settlements and have designed a system of civil justice that embodies and expresses ...


Turning From Tort To Administration, Richard A. Nagareda Feb 1996

Turning From Tort To Administration, Richard A. Nagareda

Michigan Law Review

My objective here is to challenge the notion that the recent mass tort settlements - for all their novel qualities in the mass tort area - are truly sui generis in the law. Rather, I contend that the rise of such settlements in tort mirrors the development of public administrative agencies earlier in this century - that, in both instances, powerful new institutions emerged outside preexisting channels of control to wield significant power over human lives and resources. I argue that courts usefully may draw upon familiar doctrines of judicial review in administrative law to form a conceptual framework for their analysis of ...


Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts In A System Geared To Settlement, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud Jan 1996

Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts In A System Geared To Settlement, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud

Articles

If it is true, as we often hear, that we are one of the most litigious societies on earth, it is because of our propensity to sue, not our affinity for trials. Of the hundreds of thousands of civil lawsuits that are filed each year in America, the great majority are settled; of those that are not settled, most are ultimately dismissed by the plaintiffs or by the courts; only a few percent are tried to a jury or a judge. This is no accident. We prefer settlements and have designed a system of civil justice that embodies and expresses ...


Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Russell Korobkin, Chris Guthrie Oct 1994

Psychological Barriers To Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, Russell Korobkin, Chris Guthrie

Michigan Law Review

In this article, we seek to substantiate "psychological barriers," as illustrated by the constructs described above, as a third explanation for the failure of legal disputants to settle out of court. Although we are not the first to hypothesize that psychological processes can, in theory, affect legal dispute negotiations, we attempt to give more definition to the otherwise vague contours of the psychological barriers hypothesis by bringing empirical data to bear on the question. To achieve this end, we conducted a series of nine laboratory experiments - involving nearly 450 subjects - designed to isolate the effects of the three psychological processes ...


Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules And Contingency Fees: Their Impact On Settlement Incentives, Bradley L. Smith Jun 1992

Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules And Contingency Fees: Their Impact On Settlement Incentives, Bradley L. Smith

Michigan Law Review

This Note seeks to predict the direction and magnitude of the change in settlement frequency under the three fee-shifting rules: American, British, and the British rule as modified by the PCC. Part I analyzes the proposed rule using the theoretical model of litigation and settlement developed by Hause. Part II examines the impact of fee-shifting when the plaintiff's lawyer receives reimbursement via a contingency fee. Analysis of indemnification in a contingency fee context raises several policy issues which section II.A addresses. Section II.B discusses the terms and assumptions made in adjusting Hause's model to reflect the ...


Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud Jan 1991

Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud

Articles

A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial. More important, the nature of our civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in many cases, to agree ...


Seminar On Evidence And Trial Practice, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law, Robert G. Lawson, William H. Fortune, Thomas L. Osborne, William R. Garmer, Richard H. Underwood, Robert L. Elliott, Peggy E. Purdom, Andre E. Busald, William J. Kathman Aug 1987

Seminar On Evidence And Trial Practice, Office Of Continuing Legal Education At The University Of Kentucky College Of Law, Robert G. Lawson, William H. Fortune, Thomas L. Osborne, William R. Garmer, Richard H. Underwood, Robert L. Elliott, Peggy E. Purdom, Andre E. Busald, William J. Kathman

Continuing Legal Education Materials

Outlines of speaker presentations offered during a series of one day seminars on evidence and trial practice offered by UK/CLE in late 1987-early 1988.


Proposals To Amend Rule 68- Time To Abandon Ship, Stephen B. Burbank Jan 1986

Proposals To Amend Rule 68- Time To Abandon Ship, Stephen B. Burbank

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

It is no surprise that, having included "facilitating the settlement of the case" as one of the objectives of pretrial conferences in the 1983 amendments to Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Advisory Committee has turned its attention to Rule 68. The Rule was intended to provide an incentive to settle by requiring that a prevailing claimant who has declined a more favorable offer of judgment pay post-offer "costs." But, in the Advisory Committee's view, Rule 68 has proved ineffective. The concern, apparently, is not that too few civil cases filed in federal court are ...


Abuse In Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need For A Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, Sylvia R. Lazos Nov 1985

Abuse In Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need For A Guardian During Pretrial Settlement Negotiations, Sylvia R. Lazos

Michigan Law Review

This Note explores the problem of abuse of the class action device during the pretrial settlement process. Part I analyzes the underlying sources of potential abuse in pretrial settlement negotiations. Part II assesses the adequacy of the standards currently used by courts to detect collusive class action settlements. Part III concludes that the appointment of a neutral third-party guardian to oversee the pretrial negotiation process furthers the judicial policy of encouraging settlements while protecting the interests of the absentee class.


The Applicability Of The Antitrust Procedures And Penalties Act Of 1974 To Voluntary Dismissals, Jon B. Jacobs Oct 1985

The Applicability Of The Antitrust Procedures And Penalties Act Of 1974 To Voluntary Dismissals, Jon B. Jacobs

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

This Note argues that Congress should amend the APPA to require a judicial public interest determination prior to the entry of a voluntary dismissal in government-initiated civil antitrust actions. Part I of this Note briefly describes the APPA and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). Part II asserts that APPA procedures do not currently apply to voluntary dismissals under Rule 41(a)(1). Part III concludes that the purposes underlying the APPA and general policy considerations support the legislative extension of the Act to dismissals. Part IV responds to objections to this proposal. Finally, Part V presents a ...


The Scope Of Judicial Review Of Consent Decrees Under The Antitrust Procedures And Penalties Act Of 1974, Michigan Law Review Oct 1983

The Scope Of Judicial Review Of Consent Decrees Under The Antitrust Procedures And Penalties Act Of 1974, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

In the wake of this uncertainty, this Note analyzes the proper scope of judicial review of consent decrees. The Note argues that to further the policies embodied in the APP A, courts should undertake intense review of proposed settlements before entering them as final judgments. Both the congressional intent in enacting the APP A and the public's interest in effective enforcement of the antitrust laws support intense judicial review. The Note then demonstrates that the deferential standard that some courts have applied is derived mainly from a case that is inapplicable to the review of consent decrees. Finally, the ...


Quantification Of Federal And Indian Reserved Rights Through Negotiation [Outline], Daniel M. Rosenfelt Jun 1981

Quantification Of Federal And Indian Reserved Rights Through Negotiation [Outline], Daniel M. Rosenfelt

Water Resources Allocation: Laws and Emerging Issues: A Short Course (Summer Conference, June 8-11)

2 pages.


The Tentative Settlement Class And Class Action Suits Under Title Vii Of The Civil Rights Act, Michigan Law Review Jun 1974

The Tentative Settlement Class And Class Action Suits Under Title Vii Of The Civil Rights Act, Michigan Law Review

Michigan Law Review

This Note will examine the potential utility of a tentative settlement class (TSC) in suits initiated under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The advantages and disadvantages of the TSC will be discussed in the context of analyzing whether the use of a TSC is valid under rules 23(a) and 23(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The discussion of the merits of the TSC in the title VII context will illustrate the problems inherent in the use of a tentative class for encouraging settlements of any class action.