Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Litigation

Settlement

Institution
Publication Year
Publication
Publication Type
File Type

Articles 1 - 30 of 77

Full-Text Articles in Law

Appraising Problems, Not Stuff, Chad J. Pomeroy May 2021

Appraising Problems, Not Stuff, Chad J. Pomeroy

St. Mary's Law Journal

Abstract forthcoming.


Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop Mar 2020

Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival or entrant. Importantly, the firms in such cases generally have asymmetric stakes: the defendant typically has a much larger financial interest on the line. We explore the broad policy implications of this fact using a novel model of litigation with endogenous effort. Asymmetric stakes lead dominant defendants to invest systematically more resources into litigation, causing the plaintiff's success probability to fall below the efficient level--a distortion that carries over to ex ante settlements. We explain that enhanced damages may reduce the problem ...


In Re Trulia: Revisited And Revitalized, Emma Weiss Jan 2018

In Re Trulia: Revisited And Revitalized, Emma Weiss

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.


The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2017

The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.This paper is an effort to assist courts ...


Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2017

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”This article is an effort to help ...


Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2017

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Aaron Edlin

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply ...


Newsroom: Logan Quoted In Bloomberg News On Opiod Litigation 08-16-2017, Jef Feeley, Jared S. Hopkins Aug 2017

Newsroom: Logan Quoted In Bloomberg News On Opiod Litigation 08-16-2017, Jef Feeley, Jared S. Hopkins

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.


Newsroom: Trump: Full Employment For Lawyers 04-04-2017, David Logan Apr 2017

Newsroom: Trump: Full Employment For Lawyers 04-04-2017, David Logan

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.


Medicare Secondary Payer And Settlement Delay, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick Jul 2015

Medicare Secondary Payer And Settlement Delay, Eric Helland, Jonathan Klick

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Medicare Secondary Payer Act of 1980 and its subsequent amendments require that insurers and self-insured companies report settlements, awards, and judgments that involve a Medicare beneficiary to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The parties then may be required to compensate CMS for its conditional payments. In a simple settlement model, this makes settlement less likely. Also, the reporting delays and uncertainty regarding the size of these conditional payments are likely to further frustrate the settlement process. We provide results, using data from a large insurer, showing that, on average, implementation of the MSP reporting amendments led to ...


Judging Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch Apr 2015

Judging Multidistrict Litigation, Elizabeth Chamblee Burch

Scholarly Works

High-stakes multidistrict litigations saddle the transferee judges who manage them with an odd juxtaposition of power and impotence. On one hand, judges appoint and compensate lead lawyers (who effectively replace parties’ chosen counsel) and promote settlement with scant appellate scrutiny or legislative oversight. But on the other, without the arsenal class certification once afforded, judges are relatively powerless to police the private settlements they encourage. Of course, this power shortage is of little concern since parties consent to settle.

Or do they? Contrary to conventional wisdom, this Article introduces new empirical data revealing that judges appoint an overwhelming number of ...


The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Apr 2015

The Actavis Inference: Theory And Practice, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In FTC v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court considered "reverse payment" settlements of patent infringement litigation. In such a settlement, a patentee pays the alleged infringer to settle, and the alleged infringer agrees not to enter the market for a period of time. The Court held that a reverse payment settlement violates antitrust law if the patentee is paying to avoid competition. The core insight of Actavis is the Actavis Inference: a large and otherwise unexplained payment, combined with delayed entry, supports a reasonable inference of harm to consumers from lessened competition.

This paper is an effort to assist courts ...


When Peace Is Not The Goal Of A Class Action Settlement, D. Theodore Rave Feb 2015

When Peace Is Not The Goal Of A Class Action Settlement, D. Theodore Rave

D. Theodore Rave

On the conventional account, a class action settlement is a vehicle through which the defendant buys peace from the class action lawyer. That single transaction will preclude future litigation by all class members. But peace, at least through preclusion, may not always be the goal. In a recent Fair Credit Reporting Action (FCRA) case, In re Trans Union Privacy Litigation, the parties agreed to a class action settlement that did not preclude individual claims. The 190 million class members surrendered only their rights to participate in a future class or aggregate action; they remained free to march right back into ...


There Is No Such Thing As Litigation: Access To Justice And The Realities Of Adjudication, Robert Rubinson Jan 2015

There Is No Such Thing As Litigation: Access To Justice And The Realities Of Adjudication, Robert Rubinson

All Faculty Scholarship

Does a "contest by judicial process" describe litigation's "means and applications"? Overwhelmingly, no. Litigation is not about judges: it is about default judgments, settlements, plea bargains. It sometimes does not even involve judges at all. Litigation is not about trials: the amount of litigation that goes to trial is infinitesimal. It is not about "process": the process is so minimal that to dignify it with that term stretches the word beyond recognition. It is not a "contest": it is an exercise where one side has no plausible chance of winning, especially since that side either has no lawyers or ...


Cognitive Fallacies Reading List, Curtis E.A. Karnow Dec 2014

Cognitive Fallacies Reading List, Curtis E.A. Karnow

Curtis E.A. Karnow

Reading list of books, articles, reports, and other material relating to cognitive fallacies, i.e., errors in reasoning which affect us all, including lawyers and judges. These errors in turn affect lawyers’ competence and judges’ ability to provide fair, impartial and well-reasoned decisions.


Good Pretrial Lawyering: Planning To Get To Yes Sooner, Cheaper, And Better, John M. Lande Oct 2014

Good Pretrial Lawyering: Planning To Get To Yes Sooner, Cheaper, And Better, John M. Lande

Faculty Publications

Although the ostensible purpose for pretrial litigation is to prepare for trial, such preparation is inextricably intertwined with negotiation because the expected trial outcome is a major factor affecting negotiation. Indeed, since most litigated cases are settled, good litigators prepare for negotiation at least as much as trial. The lawyers interviewed for this article, who were selected because of their good reputations, described how they prepare for both possibilities. They recommend taking charge of their cases from the outset, which includes getting a clear understanding of clients and their interests, developing good relationships with counterpart lawyers, carefully investigating the cases ...


Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2014

Actavis And Error Costs: A Reply To Critics, Aaron S. Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

The Supreme Court’s opinion in Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. In our previous article, Activating Actavis, we identified and operationalized the essential features of the Court’s analysis. Our analysis has been challenged by four economists, who argue that our approach might condemn procompetitive settlements.

As we explain in this reply, such settlements are feasible, however, only under special circumstances. Moreover, even where feasible, the parties would not actually choose such a settlement in equilibrium. These considerations, and others discussed in the reply ...


In Re Mstg And The Shifting Role Of Litigation-Related Patent Licenses In Reasonable Royalty Rate Determinations, Whitney Levandusky Jan 2014

In Re Mstg And The Shifting Role Of Litigation-Related Patent Licenses In Reasonable Royalty Rate Determinations, Whitney Levandusky

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.


Against Settlement Of (Some) Patent Cases, Megan M. La Belle Jan 2014

Against Settlement Of (Some) Patent Cases, Megan M. La Belle

Scholarly Articles and Other Contributions

For decades now, there has been a pronounced trend away from adjudication and toward settlement in civil litigation. This settlement phenomenon has spawned a vast critical literature beginning with Owen Fiss’s seminal work, Against Settlement. Fiss opposes settlement because it achieves peace rather than justice, and because settlements often are coerced due to power and resource imbalances between the parties. Other critics have questioned the role that courts play (or ought to play) in settlement proceedings, and have argued that the secondary effects of settlement – especially the lack of decisional law – are damaging to our judicial system. Still, despite ...


Future Claimants And The Quest For Global Peace, Rhonda Wasserman Jan 2014

Future Claimants And The Quest For Global Peace, Rhonda Wasserman

Articles

n the mass tort context, the defendant typically seeks to resolve all of the claims against it in one fell swoop. But the defendant’s interest in global peace is often unattainable in cases involving future claimants – those individuals who have already been exposed to a toxic material or defective product, but whose injuries have not yet manifested sufficiently to support a claim or motivate them to pursue it. The class action vehicle cannot be used because it is impossible to provide reasonable notice and adequate representation to future claimants. Likewise, non-class aggregate settlements cannot be deployed because future claimants ...


Solving The Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Manadatory Summary Judgment, David Rosenberg, Randy J. Kozel Nov 2013

Solving The Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Manadatory Summary Judgment, David Rosenberg, Randy J. Kozel

Randy J Kozel

The nuisance-value settlement problem arises whenever a litigant can profitably initiate a meritless claim or defense and offer to settle it for less than it would cost the opposing litigant to have a court dismiss the claim or defense on a standard motion for merits review like summary judgment. The opposing litigant confronted with such a nuisance-value claim or defense rationally would agree to settle for any amount up to the cost of litigating to have it dismissed. These settlement payoffs skew litigation outcomes away from socially appropriate levels, undermining the deterrence and compensation objectives of civil liability. Yet current ...


Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro Oct 2013

Activating Actavis, Aaron Edlin, C. Scott Hemphill, Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Carl Shapiro

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., the Supreme Court provided fundamental guidance about how courts should handle antitrust challenges to reverse payment patent settlements. The Court came down strongly in favor of an antitrust solution to the problem, concluding that “an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than the Eleventh Circuit believed.” At the same time, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court did not answer every relevant question. The opinion closed by “leav[ing] to the lower courts the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”

This article is an effort to help ...


Toward A Regulatory Framework For Third-Party Funding Of Litigation, Keith Hylton Jun 2013

Toward A Regulatory Framework For Third-Party Funding Of Litigation, Keith Hylton

Faculty Scholarship

Because third-party funding and sales of legal rights are equivalent in terms of their economics, I examine arrangements in which third-party sales of legal rights are permitted today – waiver, subrogation, and settlement agreements. The existing arrangements provide valuable lessons for the appropriate regulatory approach to third-party financing of litigation.


Some Important Causes For Settlement In American Civil Litigation, Felipe Forte Cobo Apr 2013

Some Important Causes For Settlement In American Civil Litigation, Felipe Forte Cobo

LLM Theses and Essays

This paper focuses on pure economic disputes such as contract, real property and tort conflicts, in which the economic efficiency model is very accepted. In this limited scenario, the consensual resolution of disputes is always more efficient than decisions made by a third-party decision-maker, whether from a post-trial or pre-trial perspective.

Considering that lower transaction costs drive parties towards settlement, part II of this essay provides an overview of the American costs of legal disputes, framing several issues that might be determinative to settlements. Part III explores how two specific American procedural institutes – discovery and civil jury trial – contribute to ...


Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French Jan 2013

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Journal Articles

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing ...


Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French Dec 2012

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Christopher C. French

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing ...


Mandatory Class Action Lawsuits As A Restructuring Technique, Bryant B. Edwards, Jeffrey A. Herbst, Selina K. Hewitt Nov 2012

Mandatory Class Action Lawsuits As A Restructuring Technique, Bryant B. Edwards, Jeffrey A. Herbst, Selina K. Hewitt

Pepperdine Law Review

No abstract provided.


Immunizing Arbitrators From Claims For Equitable Relief, Michael D. Moberly Mar 2012

Immunizing Arbitrators From Claims For Equitable Relief, Michael D. Moberly

Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal

The article begins with a summary of the historical origins of the judicial and arbitral immunity doctrines. Next, the article discusses the courts' refusal to extend judicial immunity to claims for declaratory, injunctive, or other equitable relief, except perhaps in the case of federal judges. The article then explores the propriety of recognizing a similar limitation in cases construing the arbitral immunity doctrine. The article ultimately concludes that (1) arbitrators should be immune from claims for equitable relief as a matter of policy, and (2) in jurisdictions where that result is currently precluded by existing precedent, a comparable result can ...


The Relational Contingency Of Rights, Gideon Parchomovsky, Alex Stein Feb 2012

The Relational Contingency Of Rights, Gideon Parchomovsky, Alex Stein

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

In this Article, we demonstrate, contrary to conventional wisdom, that all rights are relationally contingent. Our main thesis is that rights afford their holders meaningful protection only against challengers who face higher litigation costs than the rightholder. Contrariwise, challengers who can litigate more cheaply than a rightholder can force the rightholder to forfeit the right and thereby render the right ineffective. Consequently, in the real world, rights avail only against certain challengers but not others. This result is robust and pervasive. Furthermore, it obtains irrespectively of how rights and other legal entitlements are defined by the legislator or construed by ...


Market-Based Prediction Models As An Aid To Litigation Strategy And Settlement Negotiations, Kris Steckman Jan 2012

Market-Based Prediction Models As An Aid To Litigation Strategy And Settlement Negotiations, Kris Steckman

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

In his recent book, “Litigation is War,” Fredrick L. Whitmer suggests effective advocacy in litigation mirrors many tactics common in strategic military preparation. On a battlefield or in a courtroom, quantifying the likelihood of uncertainties that may hinder or facilitate a particular line of attack will provide an advantage to the party holding such information. Consider this scenario: you are a plaintiff bringing suit against a corporation for ten million dollars, your trial starts in two weeks, the corporation has offered to settle for one million dollars, but you believe that you deserve more; do you accept? There is no ...


Secret Class Action Settlements, Rhonda Wasserman Jan 2012

Secret Class Action Settlements, Rhonda Wasserman

Articles

This Article analyzes the phenomenon of secret class action settlements. To illustrate the practice, Part I undertakes a case study of a class action lawsuit that recently settled under seal. Part II seeks to ascertain the scope of the practice. Part II.A examines newspaper accounts describing class action settlements from around the country. Part II.B focuses on a single federal judicial district – the Western District of Pennsylvania – and seeks to ascertain the percentage of suits filed as class actions that were settled under seal. Having gained some understanding of the scope of the practice, the Article then seeks ...