Law Commons^™

Judicial-Ish Efficiency: An Analysis Of Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs In Delaware Superior Court, Jordan Hicks

Washington and Lee Law Review

Since the late twentieth century, federal and state jurisdictions across the United States have explored the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) programs to resolve legal disputes. ADR programs provide extrajudicial mechanisms through which parties can resolve their disputes without the delay and expense of a traditional judicial proceeding. Courts and practitioners alike have lauded ADR programs. For litigators, ADR programs are a way to deliver outcomes to clients quickly and efficiently. For courts, ADR programs are a way to remove cases from overcrowded dockets.

While ADR is generally considered to be speedier and more cost-efficient than a trial, little …

Comment: Court Adr Analytics, Benjamin G. Davis

Washington and Lee Law Review

For the reasons in my comments below, Jordan Hicks’s note entitled Judicial-ish Efficiency: An Analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution Programs in Delaware Superior Court is a tour de force. Its content and methodology suggest a fresh approach to thinking about court-annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”) in general and court-annexed mandatory nonbinding arbitration programs in particular. The meticulous analysis of three different eras (1978–2008, 2008–2018, and 2018–present) of the program, with a focus on judicial efficiency (speed, failure rate, and prejudicial concerns), provides an important template for how this work might be expanded to look at programs in other courts …

Federal Forum Provisions And The Internal Affairs Doctrine, Dhruv Aggarwal, Albert H. Choi

Law & Economics Working Papers

A key question at the intersection of state and federal law is whether corporations can use their charters or bylaws to restrict securities litigation to federal court. In December 2018, the Delaware Chancery Court answered this question in the negative in the landmark decision Sciabacucchi v. Salzberg. The court invalidated “federal forum provisions” (“FFPs”) that allow companies to select federal district courts as the exclusive venue for claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”). The decision held that the internal affairs doctrine, which is the bedrock of U.S. corporate law, does not permit charter and bylaw provisions …

The Lost Lessons Of Shareholder Derivative Suits, Jessica Erickson

Washington and Lee Law Review

Merger litigation has changed dramatically. Today, nearly every announcement of a significant merger sparks litigation, and these cases look quite different from merger cases in the past. These cases are now filed primarily outside of Delaware, they typically settle without shareholders receiving any financial consideration, and corporate boards now have far more ex ante power to shape these cases. Although these changes are often heralded as unprecedented, they are not. Over the past several decades, derivative suits experienced many of the same changes. This Article explores the similarities between the recent changes in merger litigation and the longer history of …

In Re Trulia: Revisited And Revitalized, Emma Weiss

University of Richmond Law Review

No abstract provided.

Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis Of Venue Choice In Bankruptcy , Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.

Kenneth Ayotte

We analyze a sample of large Chapter 11 cases to determine which factors motivate the choice of filing in one court over another when a choice is available. We focus in particular on the Delaware court, which became the most popular venue for large corporations in the 1990s. We find no evidence of agency problems governing the venue choice or affecting the outcome of the bankruptcy process. Instead, firm characteristics and court characteristics, particularly a court's level of experience, are the most important factors. We find that court experience manifests itself in both a greater ability to reorganize marginal firms …

Unilateral Forum Selection Clauses In Corporate Bylaws: A Synopsis Of The Debate, Bryce Cullinane

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Lessons Of 2013: The Perils Of "Ready, Fire, Aim" And The Importance Of An Integrated Litigation Strategy In Corporate Governance Matters, Thad A. Davis, Leslie A. Wulff

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

Fall 2013 Symposium: Contemporary Trends In Corporate Litigation, Robert Anderson Iv, Myron T. Steele, Katherine J. Blair, Thad A. Davis, James R. Griffin, James J. Moloney

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

No abstract provided.

A Blended Approach To Reducing The Costs Of Shareholder Litigation, Valian A. Afshar

Michigan Law Review

Multiforum litigation and federal securities law class actions impose heavy costs on corporations and their shareholders without producing proportionate benefits. Both are largely the result of the agency problem between shareholders and their attorneys, driven more by the attorneys’ interests in generating fees than by the interests of their clients. In response to each of these problems, commentators have recommended a number of solutions. Chief among them are forum selection and mandatory arbitration provisions in a corporation’s charter or bylaws. This Note recommends that corporations unilaterally adopt both forum selection and mandatory arbitration bylaws to address shareholder lawsuits under state …

Wasting The Corporate Waste Doctrine: Why Waste Claims Are Obsolete In Delaware Corporate Law And Why The Waste Doctrine Is The Wrong Solution To The Problem Of Executive Compensation, Kris S. Swift

Kris S. Swift

Abstract

Kristen S. Swift

This Note makes several points, drawn from Delaware litigation history, on the futility of pleading corporate waste in Delaware. At inception, the waste doctrine was a tool for shareholder protection and empowerment; however, as calculated business risk became encouraged and later formally protected by the business judgment rule, the waste doctrine evolved to protect officers and boards and now sets a nearly impossible benchmark for misconduct that would allow shareholders to recover on a waste claim. The waste doctrine is inextricably tied to how business risk-taking is perceived by Delaware courts and shifting attitudes toward risk …

Good Faith In The World Of Delaware Corporate Litigation: A Strategic Perspective On Recent Developments In Fiduciary Duty Law, Zachary S. Klughaupt

ExpressO

The Delaware Chancery’s new-found willingness to hold corporate directors accountable for breaching the duty of good faith has provoked widespread attention in both the business and legal communities. Legal practitioners and scholars recognize the novelty of Delaware’s recent good faith jurisprudence, as well as its potential to expose directors to gigantic personal damage awards, and in fact have published numerous articles that seek to delimit the boundaries of good faith conduct. But until now, most discussions of good faith as a fiduciary duty have approached the subject as an abstract measure of conduct, showing little regard for how a complaint …

Why Do Distressed Companies Choose Delaware? An Empirical Analysis Of Venue Choice In Bankruptcy , Kenneth M. Ayotte, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

We analyze a sample of large Chapter 11 cases to determine which factors motivate the choice of filing in one court over another when a choice is available. We focus in particular on the Delaware court, which became the most popular venue for large corporations in the 1990s. We find no evidence of agency problems governing the venue choice or affecting the outcome of the bankruptcy process. Instead, firm characteristics and court characteristics, particularly a court's level of experience, are the most important factors. We find that court experience manifests itself in both a greater ability to reorganize marginal firms …

Constitutional Law–Due Process–Equal Protection Of The Laws–Anti-"Strike Suit'' Legislation Held Constitutional, Joseph Gricar S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

Plaintiff brought a derivative suit against the defendant, a Delaware corporation, in a United States district court in New Jersey. While the suit was in process, New Jersey passed a statute permitting a corporation in whose name a suit was brought to demand security for reasonable expenses including attorney fees. The plaintiff stockholder was to be liable for such expenses if the suit was unsuccessful. The statute was not to apply when the complainant's holding represented 5% of the par or stated value of the corporation's outstanding stock or had a value of $50,000. Since the act applied to suits …