Law Commons^™

Lead Plaintiff Incentives In Aggregate Litigation, Charles R. Korsmo, Minor Myers

Vanderbilt Law Review

The lead plaintiff role holds out considerable promise in promoting the deterrence and compensation goals of aggregate litigation. The prevailing approach to compensating lead plaintiffs, however, provides no real incentive for a lead plaintiff to bring claims on behalf of a broader group. The policy challenge is to induce sophisticated parties to press claims not in their individual capacity but instead in a representative capacity, conferring a positive externality on all class members by identifying attractive claims, financing ongoing litigation, and managing the work of attorneys. We outline what an active and engaged lead plaintiff could add to the civil …

The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, Pamela K. Bookman

Vanderbilt Law Review

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act is universally touted as favoring arbitration. Its arbitration cases and decisions in other areas are also viewed as supporting the Court's more general hostility to litigation. These pro-arbitration and anti-litigation policies can be mutually reinforcing. Moreover, they appear to be mutually consistent, in part because the Court describes the essential features of arbitration as being "informal," "speedy," "efficient"-in short, the categorical opposite of litigation.

This Article contends that the Court's approach is not as "pro- arbitration" as it appears. On the contrary, the Court's pro-arbitration and anti- litigation values sometimes conflict. …

Public Relations Litigation, Kishanthi Parella

Vanderbilt Law Review

Conventional wisdom holds that lawsuits harm a corporation's reputation. So why do corporations and other businesses litigate even when they will likely lose in the court of law and the court of public opinion? One explanation is settlement: some parties file lawsuits not to win but to force the defendant to pay out. But some business litigants defy even this explanation; they do not expect to win the lawsuit or to benefit financially from settlement. What explains their behavior?

The answer is reputation. This Article explains that certain types of litigation can improve a business litigant's reputation in the eyes …

Federal Regulation Of Third-Party Litigation Finance, Austin T. Popp

Vanderbilt Law Review

Third-party litigation finance has become a powerful and influential industry that will continue to play a significant role in shaping the legal landscape for years to come. The opportunities-and challenges-introduced by this burgeoning industry are legion, and with them has come a swath of disparate state regulations. These regimes have failed to balance important consumer- and commercial-lending protections with facilitation of the growth of an industry that is essential to increasing access to the courtroom.

In response, this Note contends that a federal agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, should be delegated the authority to promulgate regulations (1) capping interest …