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The Professor Anthony J. Santoro Business Law Lecture Series Presents Becoming A Valued Business Lawyer, Roger Williams University School Of Law, Michael M. Bowden
The Professor Anthony J. Santoro Business Law Lecture Series Presents Becoming A Valued Business Lawyer, Roger Williams University School Of Law, Michael M. Bowden
School of Law Conferences, Lectures & Events
No abstract provided.
The Secrecy Interest In Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Lisa Bernstein
The Secrecy Interest In Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Lisa Bernstein
Articles
A long and distinguished line of law-and-economics articles has established that in many circumstances fully compensatory expectation damages are a desirable remedy for breach of contract because they induce both efficient performance and efficient breach. The expectation measure, which seeks to put the breached-against party in the position she would have been in had the contract been performed, has, therefore, rightly been chosen as the dominant contract default rule. It does a far better job of regulating breach-or-perform incentives than its leading competitors-the restitution measure, the reliance measure, and specific performance. This Essay does not directly take issue with the …
Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Articles
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial. More important, the nature of our civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in many cases, to agree …