Law Commons^™

Civil Rights, Access To Counsel, And Injunctive Class Actions In The United States, Maureen Carroll

Book Chapters

According to a familiar story about class actions in the United States, aggregation promotes access to counsel by increasing the amount of money from which counsel fees can be taken. Courts usually award class counsel a percentage of the monetary recovery obtained on behalf of the class, and class treatment can turn a $30 case into a $3 million case. But what about class actions that do not involve monetary relief at all? Some civil rights plaintiffs seek to stop a violation, rather than to obtain compensation for past harm, and therefore choose to pursue only an injunction or declaratory …

Fee-Shifting Statutes And Compensation For Risk, Maureen S. Carroll

Articles

A law firm that enters into a contingency arrangement provides the client with more than just its attorneys' labor. It also provides a form of financing, because the firm will be paid (if at all) only after the litigation ends; and insurance, because if the litigation results in a low recovery (or no recovery at all), the firm will absorb the direct and indirect costs of the litigation. Courts and markets routinely pay for these types of risk-bearing services through a range of mechanisms, including state fee shifting statutes, contingent percentage fees, common-fund awards, alternative fee arrangements, and third-party litigation …

Class Warfare: Why Antitrust Class Actions Are Essential For Compensation And Deterrence, Robert H. Lande

All Faculty Scholarship

Recent empirical studies demonstrate five reasons why antitrust class action cases are essential: (1) class actions are virtually the only way for most victims of antitrust violations to receive compensation; (2) most successful class actions involve collusion that was anticompetitive; (3) class victims’ compensation has been modest, generally less than their damages; (4) class actions deter significant amounts of collusion and other anticompetitive behavior; and (5) anticompetitive collusion is underdeterred, a problem that would be exacerbated without class actions. Unfortunately, a number of court decisions have undermined class action cases, thus preventing much effective and important antitrust enforcement.

Newsroom: Logan On Kenneth Feinberg 03-12-2016, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

Class Action Myopia, Maureen Carroll

Articles

Over the past two decades, courts and commentators have often treated the class action as though it were a monolith, limiting their analysis to the particular class form that joins together a large number of claims for monetary relief This Article argues that the myopic focus on the aggregated-damages class action has led to undertheorization of the other class-action subtypes, which serve far different purposes and have far different effects, and has allowed the ongoing backlash against the aggregated-damages class action to affect the other subtypes in an undifferentiated manner. The failure to confine this backlash to its intended target …

Newsroom: National Law Journal: Logan On Bp Claims, Roger Williams University School Of Law

Life of the Law School (1993- )

No abstract provided.

The Extraordinary Deterrence Of Private Antitrust Enforcement: A Reply To Werden, Robert H. Lande, Joshua P. Davis

All Faculty Scholarship

Our article, "Comparative Deterrence from Private Enforcement and Criminal Enforcement of the U.S. Antitrust Laws," 2011 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 315, documented an extraordinary but usually overlooked fact: private antitrust enforcement deters a significant amount of anticompetitive conduct. Indeed, the article showed that private enforcement "probably" deters even more anticompetitive conduct than the almost universally admired anti-cartel enforcement program of the United States Department of Justice.

In a recent issue of Antitrust Bulletin, Gregory J. Werden, Scott D. Hammond, and Belinda A. Barnett challenged our analysis. They asserted that our comparison “is more misleading than informative.” It is unsurprising that they …

Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.

In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states …

Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane

Articles

Private litigation is the predominant means of antitrust enforcement in the United States. Other jurisdictions around the world are increasingly implementing private enforcement models. Private enforcement is usually justified on either compensation or deterrence grounds. While the choice between these two goals matters, private litigation is not very effective at advancing either one. Compensation fails because the true economic victims of most antitrust violations are usually downstream consumers who are too numerous and remote to locate and compensate. Deterrence is ineffective because the time lag between the planning of the violation and the legal judgment day is usually so long …

The Growing Influence Of Tort And Property Law On Natural Resources Law: Case Studies Of Coal Bed Methane Development And Geologic Carbon Sequestration, Alexandra B. Klass

The Future of Natural Resources Law and Policy (Summer Conference, June 6-8)

19 pages.

"Alexandra B. Klass, Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School"

The Calculation Of Prejudgment Interest, Michael S. Knoll, Jeffrey M. Colon

All Faculty Scholarship

This Essay describes the proper method of calculating prejudgment interest based on sound financial principles. Using the paradigm that the claim plaintiff holds in litigation represents an involuntary loan from plaintiff to defendant and recognizing that in bankruptcy courts treat legal claims similarly to unsecured debt, we argue that prejudgment interest should be computed using the defendant's unsecured borrowing rate. Furthermore, we argue that courts should use a short-term, floating interest rate rather than a long-term rate in order to provide the proper incentive for the parties to settle. We criticize alternative bases for awarding prejudgment interest and address modifications …

A Taxing Settlement, Hanoch Dagan, James J. White

Articles

The following essay is based on the talk "Government, Citizens, and Injurious Industries: A Case Study of the Tobacco Litigation," delivered by Hanoch Dagan last May to the Detroit Chapter of the International Association of Jewish Lawyers and Jurists, and on the article "Governments, Citizens, and Injurious Industries," by Dagan and James J. White, '62, which appeared in 75.2 New York University Law Review 254-428 (May 2000). The authors hold conflicting view on the underlying issue of this topic: tobacco company product liability. Professor Dagan holds the position that tobacco companies are liable for harm done by their products; Professor …

Governments, Citizens, And Injurious Industries, Hanoch Dagan, James J. White

Articles

In this Article, Professors Hanoch Dagan and James White study the most recent challenge raised by mass torts litigation: the interference of governments with the bilateral relationship between citizens and injurious industries. Using the tobacco settlement as their case study, Dagan and White explore the important benefits and the grave dangers of recognizing governments' entitlement to reimbursement for costs they have incurred in preventing or ameliorating their citizens' injuries. They further demonstrate that the current law can help capture these benefits and guard against the entailing risks, showing how subrogation law can serve as the legal foundation of the governments' …

The Secrecy Interest In Contract Law, Omri Ben-Shahar, Lisa Bernstein

Articles

A long and distinguished line of law-and-economics articles has established that in many circumstances fully compensatory expectation damages are a desirable remedy for breach of contract because they induce both efficient performance and efficient breach. The expectation measure, which seeks to put the breached-against party in the position she would have been in had the contract been performed, has, therefore, rightly been chosen as the dominant contract default rule. It does a far better job of regulating breach-or-perform incentives than its leading competitors-the restitution measure, the reliance measure, and specific performance. This Essay does not directly take issue with the …

Governmental Liability Under Cercla, Steven A.G. Davison

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

What A Federal Natural Resource Management Agency Can Do To Avoid Takings, John D. Leshy

Regulatory Takings and Resources: What Are the Constitutional Limits? (Summer Conference, June 13-15)

6 pages.

Property Rights And Public Resources, Mark L. Pollot

Regulatory Takings and Resources: What Are the Constitutional Limits? (Summer Conference, June 13-15)

4 pages.

Regulatory Taking Of Public Water And Land Resource Development Rights After Lucas, Jerome C. Muys

Regulatory Takings and Resources: What Are the Constitutional Limits? (Summer Conference, June 13-15)

7 pages.

Making Uncle Sam Pay: A Review Of Equal Access To Justice Act Cases In The Sixth Circuit, 1983-1987, Martin Geer, Paul D. Reingold

Articles

Despite the recent admonition of the Supreme Court that a "request for attorneys' fees should not result in a second major litigation,"12 the courts have been frequently called on to interpret the often ambiguous language of the EAJA. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not been spared this difficult chore. While the 1985 amendments have clarified some provisions of the Act and affected some major decisions in the Sixth Circuit, the recent changes have also left other previously settled areas in a state of flux. This article will review the Sixth Circuit's EAJA decisions from 1983-1987, …

Agenda: Getting A Handle On Hazardous Waste Control, University Of Colorado Boulder. Natural Resources Law Center

Getting a Handle on Hazardous Waste Control (Summer Conference, June 9-10)

The conference chairman was University of Colorado School of Law professor Lawrence J. MacDonnell.

During the past ten years Congress has made the regulation of hazardous waste a priority. This conference focuses on the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, as amended in 1984, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.

This conference attracted about 100 registrants from 16 states plus the District of Columbia. John G. Welles, Regional Director for EPA Region 8, presented a luncheon address.

Norris V. Arizona Governing Committee: Titile Vii's Applicability To Arizona's Deferred Compensation Plan, Mary E. Berkheiser

Scholarly Works

Analysis of Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm., 671 F.2d 330 (9^th Cir. 1982).

The Compensation Of Medical Witnesses, Harry B. Hutchins

Articles

The power to compel testimony is inherent in every court, for without it justice could constantly be thwarted. Generally all persons may be compelled to give evidence that is relevant to the matter in controversy. If, therefore, a person who has been duly summoned as a witness at a particular trial absents himself therefrom, without just cause, or attending, refuses to give evidence or to answer questions when directed so to do by the court, he is liable to punishment for contempt.1 But there are limitations upon the general rule, some based upon principles of legal policy and some upon …

Compensation Of Experts, Henry W. Rogers

Articles

The law relating to the compensation of experts is somewhat unsettled, and the cases are not numerous in which the subject has been considered. This very fact, however, lends additional interest to the subject, and the question is one of great importance. In some of the States the law expressly provides that when a witness is summoned to testify as an expert he shall be entitled to extra compensation. Such a provision may be found in the laws of Iowa, of North Carolina, and of Rhode Island.