Law Commons^™

Emotional Adaptation And Lawsuit Settlements, Peter H. Huang

Publications

In Hedonic Adaptation and the Settlement of Civil Lawsuits, Professors John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, and Jonathan Masur note an unexplored aspect of protracted lawsuits: During prolonged litigation tort victims can adapt emotionally to even permanent injuries, and therefore are more likely to settle--and for less--than if their lawsuits proceeded faster. This Response demonstrates that this is a facile application of hedonic adaptation with the following three points. First, people care about more than happiness: Tort victims may sue to seek justice or revenge; emotions in tort litigation can be cultural evaluations; and people are often motivated by identity and …

Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis Of Confidential Settlements, Scott A. Moss

Publications

Even the most hotly contested lawsuits typically end in a confidential settlement forbidding the parties from disclosing their allegations, evidence, or settlement amount. Confidentiality draws fierce criticism for harming third parties by concealing serious misdeeds like discrimination, pollution, defective manufacturing, and sexual abuse. Others defend confidentiality as a mutually beneficial pay-for-silence bargain that facilitates settlement, serves judicial economy, and prevents frivolous copycat lawsuits. This debate is based in economic logic, yet most analyses have been surprisingly shallow as to how confidentiality affects incentives to settle. Depicting a more nuanced, complex reality of litigation and settlement, this Article reaches several conclusions …

The Unexpected Value Of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, Joseph A. Grundfest, Peter H. Huang

Publications

In this Article, we suggest that litigation can be analyzed as though it is a competitive research and development project. Developing this analogy, we present a two-stage real option model of the litigation process that involves sequential information revelation and bargaining over the surplus generated by early settlement. Litigants are risk-neutral and have no private information. The model generates results that, we believe, have analytic and normative significance for the economic analysis of litigation

From an analytic perspective, we demonstrate that negative expected value (NEV) lawsuits are analogous to out of the money call options held by plaintiffs and that …

Rethinking Statutory Antiwaiver Provisions Following The Lloyd's Of London Litigation, Mark J. Loewenstein

Publications

In the Lloyd's of London cases, the United States Courts of Appeals upheld certain forum-selection clauses that effectually deprived investors of the protections of the federal securities laws as if the investors had expressly waived those protections. This article examines statutory antiwaiver provisions in light of the Lloyd's cases, exploring the effect those provisions have on the administration of the federal securities laws, and suggests that the law be amended to allow contractual waiver in certain circumstances.

A New Options Theory For Risk Multipliers Of Attorney's Fees In Federal Civil Rights Litigation, Peter H. Huang

Publications

Given the importance of private enforcement of federal civil rights laws, Congress and the courts have attempted to encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to accept meritorious civil rights cases through fee shifting and risk multipliers. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has essentially prohibited the use of risk multipliers, thus undercompensating attorneys for the risk of losing civil rights actions and discouraging the filing of such cases. In this Article, Professor Huang develops a new options-based theory of calculating attorney's fees. Professor Huang argues that a lawsuit consists of a sequence of options to continue with the case rather than a once-and-for-all irreversible …

Attorney-Client Conflicts Of Interest And The Concept Of Non-Negotiable Fee Awards Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Emily M. Calhoun

Publications

No abstract provided.