Law Commons^™

Cy Pres And The Optimal Class Action, Jay Tidmarsh

Jay Tidmarsh

Prepared for a symposium on class actions, this Article examines the problem of cy pres relief in class actions through the lens of optimal claim structure and class membership. It finds that the present cy pres doctrine does little to advance the creation of optimal class actions, and that it may do some harm to achieving that goal. The Article then proposes an alternative “nudge” to induce putative class counsel to structure class actions in an optimal way: setting attorneys’ fees so that counsel is compensated through a combination of an hourly market rate and a percentage of the net …

Auctioning Class Settlements, Jay Tidmarsh

Jay Tidmarsh

Although they promise better deterrence at a lower cost, class actions are infected with problems that can keep them from delivering on this promise. One of these problems is the issue of agency cost, in which the agents of the class (the class representative and class counsel) advance their own interests at the expense of the class. Controlling agency cost, which often manifests itself at the time of settlement, has been the impetus behind a number of class-action reform proposals.

This Essay develops an idea that, in conjunction with reforms in fee structure and opt-out rights, controls agency costs at …