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A Fiduciary Judge's Guide To Awarding Fees In Class Actions, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
A Fiduciary Judge's Guide To Awarding Fees In Class Actions, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
It is often said that judges act as fiduciaries for the absent class members in class action litigation. If we take this seriously, how then should judges award fees to the lawyers who represent these class members? The answer is to award fees the same way rational class members would want if they could do it on their own. In this Essay, I draw on economic models and data from the market for legal representation of sophisticated clients to describe what these fee practices should look like. Although more data from sophisticated clients is no doubt needed, what we do …
The End Of Class Actions?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
The End Of Class Actions?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
In this Article, I give a status report on the life expectancy of class action litigation following the Supreme Court's decisions in Concepcion and American Express. These decisions permitted corporations to opt out of class action liability through the use of arbitration clauses, and many commentators, myself included, predicted that they would eventually lead us down a road where class actions against businesses would be all but eliminated. Enough time has now passed to make an assessment of whether these predictions are coming to fruition. I find that, although there is not yet solid evidence that businesses have flocked to …
The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
The New Look Of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, Randall Thomas, Robert B. Thompson
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Shareholder litigation is the most frequently maligned legal check on managerial misconduct within corporations. Derivative lawsuits and federal securities class actions are portrayed as slackers in debates over how best to control the managerial agency costs created by the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. In each instance, early hopes these suits would effectively monitor managerial misconduct have been replaced with concerns about the size of the litigation agency costs of such representative litigation, which can arise when a self-selected plaintiff's attorney and her client that are appointed to pursue the claims of an entire class of …