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Contracting On Litigation, Kathryn E. Spier, J.J. Prescott
Contracting On Litigation, Kathryn E. Spier, J.J. Prescott
Articles
Two risk-averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. Contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the volume and costs of litigation. These contingent contracts mimic the services provided by third-party investors, including litigation funders and insurance companies. The litigants (weakly) prefer to contract with risk-neutral third parties when the capital market is transaction-cost free. However, contracting with third parties further decreases the settlement rate, increases the costs of litigation, and may increase the aggregate cost of risk bearing.
Platform Procedure: Using Technology To Facilitate (Efficient) Civil Settlement., J.J. Prescott, Alexander Sanchez
Platform Procedure: Using Technology To Facilitate (Efficient) Civil Settlement., J.J. Prescott, Alexander Sanchez
Book Chapters
In this chapter, we explore the ability of courts to enhance the role of substantive law in case outcomes by reducing party litigation costs. When it becomes less costly for parties to engage actively in dispute resolution, the shadow of substantive law should, in theory, become more pronounced and case outcomes should change (and hopefully become more accurate/efficient on average). To empirically investigate this hypothesis, we examine the consequences of a large state court’s implementation of court-assisted online dispute resolution (ODR) tools for its small claims docket. A central goal of this technology is to reduce litigation costs of all …