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An Asymmetric Information Model Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
An Asymmetric Information Model Of Litigation, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This paper presents a cradle-to-grave model of tort liability, incorporating the decision to comply with the due-care standard, the decision to file suit, and the decision to settle. I use the model primarily to examine settlement rates, plaintiff win rates, and compliance with the due-care standard. The key results of the model are as follows: (1) litigation to judgment occurs only when some but not all actors comply with the due-care standard, and (2) if defendants have the information advantage at trial, plaintiff win rates generally will be less than 50 percent. I apply the model and its simulation results …
Welfare Implications Of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability, Keith N. Hylton
Welfare Implications Of Costly Litigation Under Strict Liability, Keith N. Hylton
Faculty Scholarship
This article examines a model of strict liability with costly litigation and presents conditions under which (1) potential injurers take optimal precautions, (2) increasing the cost of litigation enhances precaution and social welfare, (3) the optimal level of liability exceeds the compensatory level, and (4) increasing the rate of settlement enhances social welfare. The results have implications for controversies surrounding fee shifting, optimal damage awards (e.g., punitive damages), and the social desirability of settlement. The most striking implication is that fee shifting in favor of prevailing plaintiffs is socially desirable in low-transaction-cost settings.