Law Commons^™

Structural Deregulation, Jody Freeman, Sharon Jacobs

Publications

Modern critics of the administrative state portray agencies as omnipotent behemoths, invested with vast delegated powers and largely unaccountable to the political branches of government. This picture, we argue, understates agency vulnerability to an increasingly powerful presidency. One source of presidential control over agencies in particular has been overlooked: the systematic undermining of an agency’s ability to execute its statutory mandate. This strategy, which we call “structural deregulation,” is a dangerous and underappreciated aspect of what then-Professor, now-Justice Elena Kagan termed “presidential administration.”

Structural deregulation attacks the core capacities of the bureaucracy. The phenomenon encompasses such practices as leaving agencies …

Copyright Arbitrage, Kristelia A. García

Publications

Regulatory arbitrage—defined as the manipulation of regulatory treatment for the purpose of reducing regulatory costs or increasing statutory earnings—is often seen in heavily regulated industries. An increase in the regulatory nature of copyright, coupled with rapid technological advances and evolving consumer preferences, have led to an unprecedented proliferation of regulatory arbitrage in the area of copyright law. This Article offers a new scholarly account of the phenomenon herein referred to as “copyright arbitrage.”

In some cases, copyright arbitrage may work to expose and/or correct for an extant gap or inefficiency in the regulatory regime. In other cases, copyright arbitrage may …

The Statutory Separation Of Powers, Sharon B. Jacobs

Publications

Separation of powers forms the backbone of our constitutional democracy. But it also operates as an underappreciated structural principle in subconstitutional domains. This Article argues that Congress constructs statutory schemes of separation, checks, and balances through its delegations to administrative agencies. Like its constitutional counterpart, the “statutory separation of powers” seeks to prevent the dominance of factions and ensure policy stability. But separating and balancing statutory authority is a delicate business: the optimal balance is difficult to calibrate ex ante, the balance is unstable, and there are risks that executive agencies in particular might seek expansion of their authority vis-à-vis …

A Digital Age Communications Act Paradigm For Federal-State Relations, Kyle D. Dixon, Philip J. Weiser

Publications

This article captures the effort of the Digital Age Communications Act (DACA) to craft a new framework for the federal-state relationship in implementing a next generation telecommunications regulatory regime. In particular, it sets forth a DACA model that would implement a "rule of law" regulatory paradigm for an era of technological dynamism. This era requires, as the article explains, a coherent federal framework that circumscribes the role of state and local authorities so as to advance sound competition policy goals. The sole exception to this policy is the recognition that a basic local service rate retains both political and practical …

Interpreting Indian Country In State Of Alaska V. Native Village Of Venetie, Kristen A. Carpenter

Publications

According to federal Indian law's canons of construction, statutes enacted for the benefit of American Indians and Alaska Natives must be liberally interpreted in their favor. But a doctrine of statutory interpretation presently challenges certain applications of the Indian canons. Announced by the Supreme Court in Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the doctrine requires that courts defer to administrative agency interpretations of ambiguous language in statutes they are authorized to administer. In instances where agencies construe statutes against Indian interests, Chevron deference and the Indian canons dictate opposite results for a reviewing court. This conflict muddles Indian …

Introduction, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

As citizens, we ought to ensure that our criticisms of Congress are constructive, lest we damage ourselves. In that spirit, the American Bar Association's Section of Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice created a special Congressional Process Committee to study selected aspects of congressional procedures and to recommend appropriate reforms. The Committee, which I chair, is composed of administrative lawyers who are experienced in legislative practice, or who have worked in Congress. We decided to address selected aspects of congressional structure and procedure for which we believe administrative lawyers possess relevant expertise.

The articles that form this Symposium grew out of …

An American Perspective On Environmental Impact Assessment In Australia, Mark Squillace

Publications

No abstract provided.

Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Presidential Power And Administrative Rulemaking, Harold H. Bruff

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No abstract provided.

Congressional Control Of Administrative Regulation: A Study Of Legislative Vetoes, Harold H. Bruff, Ernest Gellhorn

Publications

Several administrative programs contain provisions allowing Congress to veto agency rules, and there is now a bill before Congress to extend this veto power to all agency rulemaking. In this Article, Professor Bruff and Dean Gellhorn analyze the histories of five federal programs subject to the legislative veto to determine the effect of the veto on the rulemaking process and on the relationships between the branches of government. Extrapolating from this practical experience, they suggest that a general legislative veto is unlikely to increase the overall efficiency of the administrative process, may impede the achievement of reasoned decisionmaking based on …

Presidential Exemption From Mandatory Retirement Of Members Of The Independent Regulatory Commissions, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.