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Full-Text Articles in Law

Confounded Collectors, Confused Consumers: Time To Close The Circuit Split On Whether The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Requires A Consumer To Dispute A Debt In Writing, Daniel O'Connell Sep 2015

Confounded Collectors, Confused Consumers: Time To Close The Circuit Split On Whether The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Requires A Consumer To Dispute A Debt In Writing, Daniel O'Connell

Catholic University Law Review

The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) provides that a debt collector must notify a consumer that it will assume a debt to be valid unless the consumer challenges the debt within thirty days. The FDCPA does not explicitly require the consumer to challenge the debt in writing. The Third Circuit requires written disputes, while the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits permit oral disputes. This Comment discusses the reasoning and conclusions at play in this circuit split. The Comment argues that while both sides of the debate present meritorious arguments, permitting oral disputes for purposes of rebutting the debt collector’s …


Hayekian Statutory Interpretation: A Response To Professor Bhatia, John Ehrett Aug 2015

Hayekian Statutory Interpretation: A Response To Professor Bhatia, John Ehrett

John Ehrett

In this Essay, I challenge Professor Gautam Bhatia’s recent claim that a Hayekian worldview offers the most rational framing of the philosophical vision underlying Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence. I argue that Hayek’s conception of law, more properly understood, emphasizes the context of social interaction patterns, rather than focusing exclusively on individual autonomous agents. I subsequently trace the resulting implications for interpretive methodology that flow from this distinction, and ultimately address the discontinuities between the normative visions of liberty espoused by Hayek and Scalia.


Lessons Unlearned: The Effects Of Statutory Ambiguity And The Interpretative Uncertainty It Injects In The Courts, Carolyn Singh Mar 2015

Lessons Unlearned: The Effects Of Statutory Ambiguity And The Interpretative Uncertainty It Injects In The Courts, Carolyn Singh

University of the District of Columbia Law Review

For centuries, courts have dealt with the challenge of imposing penalties for crimes when governing law changes. Applying the new provisions can be a straightforward exercise for courts, but when legislatures are ambiguous with regard to which law applies-forexample, to pending cases-the courts are forced to interpret what legislatures intended. For some judges, the answer is easily found in the plain meaning of the text. For others, legislative intent can become the deciding factor. Throughout United States history, this has been a manageable yet controversial task, but aside from interpretive differences among judges, creating laws with uncertainty is a dangerous …