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Legislative history

Texas A&M University School of Law

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon Jan 2017

Making Meaning: Towards A Narrative Theory Of Statutory Interpretation And Judicial Justification, Randy D. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

The act of judging is complex involving finding facts, interpreting law, and then deciding a particular dispute. But these are not discreet functions: they bleed into one another and are thus interdependent. This article aims to reveal-at least in part-how judges approach this process. To do so, I look at three sets of civil RICO cases that align and diverge from civil antitrust precedents. I then posit that the judges in these cases base their decisions on assumptions about RICO's purpose. These assumptions, though often tacit and therefore not subject to direct observation, are nonetheless sometimes revealed when a judge …


Of Gangs And Gaggles: Can A Corporation Be Part Of An Association-In-Fact Rico Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, And Rhetorical Perspectives, Randy D. Gordon Jul 2014

Of Gangs And Gaggles: Can A Corporation Be Part Of An Association-In-Fact Rico Enterprise? Linguistic, Historical, And Rhetorical Perspectives, Randy D. Gordon

Faculty Scholarship

Over 30 years ago, courts of appeals began to hold that the RICO statute’s definition of association-in-fact enterprise is broad enough to include corporations as constituent members, even though that definition states that such an association is limited to a “group of individuals.” This Article demonstrates why these cases were wrongly decided from a variety of perspectives: linguistic, systemic and consequentialist. It also suggests a strategy for correcting this widespread interpretive error and provides evidence that the Supreme Court may be disposed to agree that the lower courts have uniformly erred.