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Private Law In The Gaps, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski Oct 2016

Private Law In The Gaps, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Jeffrey A. Pojanowski

Private law subjects like tort, contract, and property are traditionally taken to be at the core of the common law tradition, yet statutes increasingly intersect with these bodies of doctrine. This Article draws on recent work in private law theory and statutory interpretation to consider afresh what courts should do with private law in statutory gaps. In particular, it focuses on statutes touching on tort law, a field at the leading edge of private law theory. This Article's analysis unsettles some conventional wisdom about the intersection of private law and statutes. Many leading tort scholars and jurists embrace a regulatory …


Hayekian Statutory Interpretation: A Response To Professor Bhatia, John Ehrett Aug 2015

Hayekian Statutory Interpretation: A Response To Professor Bhatia, John Ehrett

John Ehrett

In this Essay, I challenge Professor Gautam Bhatia’s recent claim that a Hayekian worldview offers the most rational framing of the philosophical vision underlying Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence. I argue that Hayek’s conception of law, more properly understood, emphasizes the context of social interaction patterns, rather than focusing exclusively on individual autonomous agents. I subsequently trace the resulting implications for interpretive methodology that flow from this distinction, and ultimately address the discontinuities between the normative visions of liberty espoused by Hayek and Scalia.


Taming A Dragon: Legislative History In Legal Analysis, Mark Deforrest Aug 2013

Taming A Dragon: Legislative History In Legal Analysis, Mark Deforrest

Mark DeForrest

ARTICLE ABSTRACT

TAMING A DRAGON:

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN LEGAL ANALYSIS

Mark DeForrest

The use of legislative history in statutory interpretation and analysis has been an area of intensive inquiry since the 1980’s. The debate has been vigorous and has led to the development of sophisticated arguments by both the advocates of the use of legislative history and textualists critical of its use. While the debate has been ongoing, changes in technology have made it easier than ever to access detailed legislative history for both state and federal statutes. This article discusses the impact of both the debate and the technological …


Factual Premises Of Statutory Interpretation In Agency Review Cases, Todd S. Aagaard Feb 2009

Factual Premises Of Statutory Interpretation In Agency Review Cases, Todd S. Aagaard

Todd S Aagaard

This Article examines factual premises of statutory interpretation in agency review cases, and proposes an approach that would better integrate the treatment of such factual premises into the overall structure of administrative law. Courts frequently encounter questions of statutory interpretation that depend on underlying factual background, context, and implications. When they do so, courts generally assume that they retain the authority to decide the factual premises and thereby to answer questions of statutory interpretation that depend on factual premises. This is problematic from a functional standpoint, because courts often lack the information or expertise necessary to assess these underlying facts …


Full Faith And Credit In The Early Congress, Stephen E. Sachs Jan 2009

Full Faith And Credit In The Early Congress, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

After more than 200 years, the Full Faith and Credit Clause remains poorly understood. The Clause first issues a self-executing command (that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given"), and then empowers Congress to prescribe the manner of proof and the "Effect" of state records in other states. But if states must accord each other full faith and credit-and if nothing could be more than full-then what "Effect" could Congress give state records that they wouldn't have already? And conversely, how could Congress in any way reduce or alter the faith and credit that is due? This Article seeks to …


John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs Aug 2008

John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

Sen. John McCain was born a U.S. citizen and is eligible to be president. The most serious challenge to his status, recently posed by Prof. Gabriel Chin, contends that the statute granting citizenship to Americans born abroad did not include the Panama Canal Zone, where McCain was born in 1936. When Congress amended the law in 1937, he concludes, it was too late for McCain to be "natural born." Even assuming, however, that McCain's citizenship depended on this statute - and ignoring his claim to citizenship at common law - Chin's argument may be based on a misreading. When the …


Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs Jan 2008

Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs

Stephen E. Sachs

Senator John McCain was born a citizen in 1936. Professor Gabriel J. Chin challenges this view in this Symposium, arguing that McCain’s birth in the Panama Canal Zone (while his father was stationed there by the Navy) fell into a loophole in the governing statute. The best historical evidence, however, suggests that this loophole is an illusion and that McCain is a "natural born Citizen" eligible to be president.


Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow Dec 2007

Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow

Donald J. Kochan

Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …