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Full-Text Articles in Law
Private Law In The Gaps, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Private Law In The Gaps, Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Jeffrey A. Pojanowski
Private law subjects like tort, contract, and property are traditionally taken to be at the core of the common law tradition, yet statutes increasingly intersect with these bodies of doctrine. This Article draws on recent work in private law theory and statutory interpretation to consider afresh what courts should do with private law in statutory gaps. In particular, it focuses on statutes touching on tort law, a field at the leading edge of private law theory. This Article's analysis unsettles some conventional wisdom about the intersection of private law and statutes. Many leading tort scholars and jurists embrace a regulatory …
Hayekian Statutory Interpretation: A Response To Professor Bhatia, John Ehrett
Hayekian Statutory Interpretation: A Response To Professor Bhatia, John Ehrett
John Ehrett
In this Essay, I challenge Professor Gautam Bhatia’s recent claim that a Hayekian worldview offers the most rational framing of the philosophical vision underlying Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence. I argue that Hayek’s conception of law, more properly understood, emphasizes the context of social interaction patterns, rather than focusing exclusively on individual autonomous agents. I subsequently trace the resulting implications for interpretive methodology that flow from this distinction, and ultimately address the discontinuities between the normative visions of liberty espoused by Hayek and Scalia.
Taming A Dragon: Legislative History In Legal Analysis, Mark Deforrest
Taming A Dragon: Legislative History In Legal Analysis, Mark Deforrest
Mark DeForrest
ARTICLE ABSTRACT
TAMING A DRAGON:
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN LEGAL ANALYSIS
Mark DeForrest
The use of legislative history in statutory interpretation and analysis has been an area of intensive inquiry since the 1980’s. The debate has been vigorous and has led to the development of sophisticated arguments by both the advocates of the use of legislative history and textualists critical of its use. While the debate has been ongoing, changes in technology have made it easier than ever to access detailed legislative history for both state and federal statutes. This article discusses the impact of both the debate and the technological …
Factual Premises Of Statutory Interpretation In Agency Review Cases, Todd S. Aagaard
Factual Premises Of Statutory Interpretation In Agency Review Cases, Todd S. Aagaard
Todd S Aagaard
This Article examines factual premises of statutory interpretation in agency review cases, and proposes an approach that would better integrate the treatment of such factual premises into the overall structure of administrative law. Courts frequently encounter questions of statutory interpretation that depend on underlying factual background, context, and implications. When they do so, courts generally assume that they retain the authority to decide the factual premises and thereby to answer questions of statutory interpretation that depend on factual premises. This is problematic from a functional standpoint, because courts often lack the information or expertise necessary to assess these underlying facts …
Full Faith And Credit In The Early Congress, Stephen E. Sachs
Full Faith And Credit In The Early Congress, Stephen E. Sachs
Stephen E. Sachs
After more than 200 years, the Full Faith and Credit Clause remains poorly understood. The Clause first issues a self-executing command (that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given"), and then empowers Congress to prescribe the manner of proof and the "Effect" of state records in other states. But if states must accord each other full faith and credit-and if nothing could be more than full-then what "Effect" could Congress give state records that they wouldn't have already? And conversely, how could Congress in any way reduce or alter the faith and credit that is due? This Article seeks to …
John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs
John Mccain's Citizenship: A Tentative Defense, Stephen E. Sachs
Stephen E. Sachs
Sen. John McCain was born a U.S. citizen and is eligible to be president. The most serious challenge to his status, recently posed by Prof. Gabriel Chin, contends that the statute granting citizenship to Americans born abroad did not include the Panama Canal Zone, where McCain was born in 1936. When Congress amended the law in 1937, he concludes, it was too late for McCain to be "natural born." Even assuming, however, that McCain's citizenship depended on this statute - and ignoring his claim to citizenship at common law - Chin's argument may be based on a misreading. When the …
Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs
Why John Mccain Was A Citizen At Birth, Stephen E. Sachs
Stephen E. Sachs
Senator John McCain was born a citizen in 1936. Professor Gabriel J. Chin challenges this view in this Symposium, arguing that McCain’s birth in the Panama Canal Zone (while his father was stationed there by the Navy) fell into a loophole in the governing statute. The best historical evidence, however, suggests that this loophole is an illusion and that McCain is a "natural born Citizen" eligible to be president.
Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow
Much Ado About Pluralities: Pride And Precedent Amidst The Cacophy Of Concurrences, And Re-Percolation After Rapanos, Donald J. Kochan, Melissa M. Berry, Matthew J. Parlow
Donald J. Kochan
Conflicts created by concurrences and pluralities in court decisions create confusion in law and lower court interpretation. Rule of law values require that individuals be able to identify controlling legal principles. That task is complicated when pluralities and concurrences contribute to the vagueness or uncertainty that leaves us wondering what the controlling rule is or attempting to predict what it will evolve to become. The rule of law is at least handicapped when continuity or confidence or confusion infuse our understanding of the applicable rules. This Article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in Rapanos v. United States to …