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Full-Text Articles in Law
Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, And Civil Rights, Daniel A. Farber
Statutory Interpretation, Legislative Inaction, And Civil Rights, Daniel A. Farber
Michigan Law Review
This month the Supreme Court will hear reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union on the question of whether section 1981 prohibits discrimination by private parties. Professor Farber identifies three issues which lie at the heart of Patterson: Must statutes be construed to conform to the intent of the drafters? Does legislative inaction provide reliable guidance to interpreters of statutes? And should the nature of the claim at issue - here a claim of civil rights - influence the interpreters? On this last point, Professor Farber argues that public values must be relevant to statutory interpretation and that judges …
Updating Statutory Interpretation, T. Alexander Aleinikoff
Updating Statutory Interpretation, T. Alexander Aleinikoff
Michigan Law Review
This month the Supreme Court will hear reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union on the question of whether section 1981 prohibits discrimination by private parties. Professor Aleinikoff examines in depth the first issue raised by Professor Farber. Using metaphors of the archeological and the nautical Professor Aleinikoff describes theories of originalism and their application to statutory interpretation. Concluding that there are nonoriginalist (or nonarcheological) elements implicit in these theories, he proceeds to consider how an explicitly nonoriginalist (or nautical) theory of interpretation might work He concludes by commenting on the application of such a theory to Patterson.
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, William N. Eskridge Jr.
Interpreting Legislative Inaction, William N. Eskridge Jr.
Michigan Law Review
This month the Supreme Court will hear reargument in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union on the question of whether section 1981 prohibits discrimination by private parties. In this article, Professor Eskridge addresses the issue of how legislative inaction should affect statutory interpretation. He begins by constructing a detailed analysis of the Court's legislative inaction cases, arguing that the case law is much more coherent than previous analysts have suggested. Professor Eskridge then considers Justice Scalia's critique of that case law and provides support for Justice Scalia's views by distinguishing actual and presumed legislative intent, arguing that, based on a conception …
Clarifying A "Pattern" Of Confusion: A Multi-Factor Approach To Civil Rico's Pattern Requirement, Ethan M. Posner
Clarifying A "Pattern" Of Confusion: A Multi-Factor Approach To Civil Rico's Pattern Requirement, Ethan M. Posner
Michigan Law Review
In an attempt to provide some needed definitional clarity and redirect civil RICO toward its intended focus, this Note argues that the federal judiciary should interpret the pattern requirement narrowly, focusing on four basic factors that best demonstrate a prolonged, continuing example of criminal activity. By emphasizing (1) the presence of multiple victims, (2) the duration of the RICO defendant's criminal activity, (3) the number of illicit commercial transactions, and (4) the existence of independent criminal decisions, courts could consistently limit civil RICO to the most pernicious offenders. Part I of this Note will examine judicial interpretations of RICO and …