Law Commons^™

Foreword — Chevron At 30: Looking Back And Looking Forward, Peter M. Shane, Christopher J. Walker

Christopher J. Walker

This Foreword introduces a Fordham Law Review symposium held in March 2014 to mark the thirtieth anniversary of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The most-cited administrative-law decision of all time, Chevron has sparked thirty years of scholarly discussion concerning what Chevron deference means, when (or even if) it should apply, and what impact it has had on the administrative state. Part I of the Foreword discusses the symposium contributions that address Chevron’s scope and application, especially in light of City of Arlington v. FCC. Part II introduces the contributions that explore empirically and theoretically Chevron’s impact outside of …

Public Lands And The Federal Government’S Compact-Based “Duty To Dispose”: A Case Study Of Utah’S H.B. 148 – The Transfer Of Public Lands Act, Donald J. Kochan

Donald J. Kochan

Recent legislation passed in March 2012 in the State of Utah — the “Transfer of Public Lands Act and Related Study,” (“TPLA”) also commonly referred to as House Bill 148 (“H.B. 148”) — has demanded that the federal government, by December 31, 2014, “extinguish title” to certain public lands that the federal government currently holds (totaling an estimated more than 20 million acres). It also calls for the transfer of such acreage to the State and establishes procedures for the development of a management regime for this increased state portfolio of land holdings resulting from the transfer. The State of …

The Inefficiencies Of Legislative Centralization: Evidence From Chinese Provincial Tax Rate Setting, Wei Cui

Wei Cui

Legislative power in China is centralized to an unusual degree, both in comparison to other countries and relative to the country’s high degree of administrative decentralization. Given its a priori inefficiencies, this arrangement should be significant from both positive and normative perspectives, but, surprisingly, has received little attention in legal and social scientific scholarship. We devise a novel method for analyzing the inefficiencies of centralization through studying provincial government behavior, examining provincial rate setting for the vehicle and vessel tax (VVT) in 2007 and 2011. Because all provinces have assigned VVT revenue and VVT administration to sub-provincial governments, provincial rate-setting …

Invisible Federalism And The Electoral College, Derek Muller

Derek T. Muller

What role do States have when the Electoral College disappears? With the enactment of the National Popular Vote on the horizon and an imminent presidential election in which a nationwide popular vote determines the winner, States would continue to do what they have done for hundreds of years — administer elections. The Constitution empowers States to decide who votes for president, and States choose who qualifies to vote based on factors like age or felon status. This power of States, a kind of “invisible federalism,” is all but ignored in Electoral College reform efforts. In fact, the power of the …

Papers, Please: Does The Constitution Permit The States A Role In Immigration Enforcement?, John C. Eastman

John C. Eastman

Should Federalism Shield Corruption?—Mail Fraud, State Law And Post-Lopez Analysis, George D. Brown

George D. Brown

In this Article, Professor Brown examines the issues that federal prosecutions of state and local officials pose. The analysis focuses on prosecutions under the mail fraud statute and considers the general debate over the proper scope of federal criminal law. Professor Brodin addresses the question of whether a re-examination of mail fraud would focus on constitutional or statutory issues and by utilizing the Supreme Court case United States v. Lopez examines the question of internal limits on the mail fraud statute.

Federal Funds And National Supremacy: The Role Of State Legislatures In Federal Grant Programs, George D. Brown

George D. Brown

No abstract provided.

Beyond The New Federalism: Revenue Sharing In Perspective, George D. Brown

George D. Brown

In 1972 Congress added General Revenue Sharing to the list of federal grant-in-aid programs for states and localities. President Nixon had recommended Revenue Sharing, as apart of his "New Federalism," because it would foster local autonomy by minimizing federal restrictions on the grants. When General Revenue Sharing was renewed in 1976, Congress made no changes in the formula, leading some commentators to minimize the significance of those changes which were made. Professor Brown argues that the 1976 renewal amendments to the Revenue Sharing Act are an example of "interventionist federalism," a new form of federal influence over state and local …