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Democracy

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Full-Text Articles in Law

Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be Democratic?, Errol E. Meidinger Nov 2017

Competitive Supragovernmental Regulation: How Could It Be Democratic?, Errol E. Meidinger

Errol Meidinger

This paper explores the possibility that a developing form of regulatory governance is also sketching out a new form of anticipatory regulatory democracy. 'Competitive supra-governmental regulation' is largely driven by non-state actors and is therefore commonly viewed as suffering a democracy deficit. However, because it stresses broad participation, intensive deliberative procedures, responsiveness to state law and widely accepted norms, and competition among regulatory programs to achieve effective implementation and widespread public acceptance, this form of regulation appears to stand up relatively well under generally understood criteria for democratic governance. Nonetheless, a more satisfactory evaluation will require a much better understanding …


Descendants Of Realism?: Policy-Oriented International Lawyers As Guardians Of Democracy, Hengameh Saberi Feb 2015

Descendants Of Realism?: Policy-Oriented International Lawyers As Guardians Of Democracy, Hengameh Saberi

Hengameh Saberi

No abstract provided.


Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram Oct 2013

Reconciling Positivism And Realism: Kelsen And Habermas On Democracy And Human Rights, David Ingram

David Ingram

It is well known that Hans Kelsen and Jürgen Habermas invoke realist arguments drawn from social science in defending an international, democratic human rights regime against Carl Schmitt’s attack on the rule of law. However, despite embracing the realist spirit of Kelsen’s legal positivism, Habermas criticizes Kelsen for neglecting to connect the rule of law with a concept of procedural justice (Part I). I argue, to the contrary (Part II), that Kelsen does connect these terms, albeit in a manner that may be best described as functional, rather than conceptual. Indeed, whereas Habermas tends to emphasize a conceptual connection between …