Law Commons^™

Antitrust Interoperability Remedies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Compelled interoperability can be a useful remedy for dominant firms, including large digital platforms, who violate the antitrust laws. They can address competition concerns without interfering unnecessarily with the structures that make digital platforms attractive and that have contributed so much to economic growth.

Given the wide variety of structures and business models for big tech, “interoperability” must be defined broadly. It can realistically include everything from “dynamic” interoperability that requires real time sharing of data and operations, to “static” interoperability which requires portability but not necessarily real time interactions. Also included are the compelled sharing of intellectual property or …

Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

Are large digital platforms that deal directly with consumers “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is surprisingly complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms the less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, competition can be made to work in most of them. Further, antitrust enforcement, with its accommodation of firm variety, is generally superior to any form of statutory regulation that generalizes over large numbers.

Assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive …

Competition Wrongs, Nicolas Cornell

Articles

In both philosophical and legal circles, it is typically assumed that wrongs depend upon having one’s rights violated. But within any market-based economy, market participants may be wronged by the conduct of other actors in the marketplace. Due to my illicit business tactics, you may lose profits, customers, employees, reputation, access to capital, or any number of other sources of value. This Article argues that such competition wrongs are an example of wrongs that arise without an underlying right, contrary to the typical philosophical and legal assumption. The Article thus draws upon various forms of business law to illustrate what …

Toward A Realistic Comparative Assessment Of Private Antitrust Enforcement, Daniel A. Crane

Book Chapters

Over the course of her extraordinary career, Eleanor Fox has contributed in many vital ways to our understanding of the importance of institutional analysis in antitrust and competition law. Most importantly, Eleanor has become the leading repository of knowledge about what is happening around the globe in the field of competition law and its enforcement institutions. At a time when much of the field of antitrust was moving in the direction of theoretical generalization, formal modeling, game theory, and the like, Eleanor tirelessly worked the globe to discover the actual practice of competition law in the world. She left no …

Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.

In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states …

Divestiture As A Remedy In Private Actions Brought Under Section 16 Of The Clayton Act, Paul V. Timmins

Michigan Law Review

This Note argues that private parties should be permitted to bring suits for divestiture under section 16 of the Clayton Act. Part I analyzes the language of section 16 and the relevant legislative history of the Clayton Act and concludes that Congress did not intend to limit the injunctive relief available to private parties. Part II argues that courts should be free to exercise their broad equity powers to grant the most appropriate and effective relief, including divestiture, to an injured plaintiff. Finally, Part III contends that policy considerations disfavor omitting divestiture from the types of equitable remedies that a …

Federal Antitrust Law - Stockholders' Remedies For Corporate Injury Resulting From Antitrust Violations: Derivative Antitrust Suit And Fiduciary Duty Action, William Y. Webb S.Ed.

Michigan Law Review

The question of what remedies are available to a stockholder whose corporation has been injured or is threatened with injury by acts violative of the federal antitrust laws is largely unexplored. The staggering fines suffered by a number of corporations in the recent electrical industry criminal antitrust convictions demonstrate, however, that the question is both timely and important. Moreover, its answer could have a great impact both upon the means of protecting corporate minority rights and upon the means of private enforcement of the federal antitrust laws. The stockholders' derivative suit affords two remedies which deal with these two points …