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Full-Text Articles in Law
Contracting Around Ruaa: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, And Judicial Review Of Arbitral Awards, Christopher R. Drahozal
Contracting Around Ruaa: Default Rules, Mandatory Rules, And Judicial Review Of Arbitral Awards, Christopher R. Drahozal
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal
By specifying that its provisions generally are default rules and listing particular exceptions, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (“RUAA”) provides much needed certainty and avoids unnecessary litigation, at least compared to the Federal Arbitration Act, which does not always identify which of its provisions are default rules. In one important respect, however, RUAA jettisons that valuable certainty. The RUAA drafters left open (or at least sought to leave open) the question whether parties can contract to expand the grounds for judicial review of arbitration awards beyond those set out in the statute. In other words, the drafters purported not to …
The Problem Of Internalization Of Social Costs And The Ideas Of Ronadl Coase, Enrico Baffi
The Problem Of Internalization Of Social Costs And The Ideas Of Ronadl Coase, Enrico Baffi
enrico baffi
In this paper, I try to show that, although some arguments elaborated by Coase do not have a great practical importance, and that it seems that the most important one against a system of remedies for each externalities (if we are able to define this concept) is difficult to create, Coase has understood many problems that they have been at the basis of later studies in tort and property law; but, what is more important here, is to underline that a system of remedies for every externalities have been refused by eminent scholars after Coase The work of the English …
Access To Consumer Remedies In The Squeaky Wheel System, Amy J. Schmitz
Access To Consumer Remedies In The Squeaky Wheel System, Amy J. Schmitz
Faculty Publications
This article explores the “Squeaky Wheel System” (“SWS”) in business-to-consumer (“B2C”) contexts, referring to merchants’ reservation of purchase remedies and other contract benefits for only the relatively few “squeaky wheel” consumers who have the requisite information and resources to persistently seek assistance. The article uncovers how this system fosters contractual discrimination and hinders consumers’ awareness and access with respect to contract remedies. It also adds empirical insights from my recent e-survey, and offers suggestions for using the internet to empower consumers of all economic and status levels with efficient and accessible means for learning about their purchase rights and asserting …
Building Bridges To Consumer Remedies In International Econflicts, Amy J. Schmitz
Building Bridges To Consumer Remedies In International Econflicts, Amy J. Schmitz
Faculty Publications
Consumer purchases over the Internet (“ePurchases”) are on the rise, thereby causing an increase in conflicts regarding these purchases (“eConflicts”). Furthermore, these conflicts are increasingly international as consumers purchase goods over the Internet not knowing or caring where the seller is physically located. The problem is that if the purchase goes awry, consumers are often left without recourse due to the futility of pursing international litigation and the textured law and policy regarding enforcement of private dispute resolution procedures, namely arbitration. The United States strictly enforces arbitration contracts in business-to-consumer (“B2C”) relationships, while other countries have refused or limited enforcement …
Instructing Juries On Noneconomic Contract Damages, David A. Hoffman, Alexander Radus
Instructing Juries On Noneconomic Contract Damages, David A. Hoffman, Alexander Radus
All Faculty Scholarship
Gathering pattern contract jury instructions from every State, we examine jurisdictions' treatment of noneconomic damages. While the conventional account holds that there is a uniform preference against awards of noneconomic damages, we find four different approaches in pattern instructions, with only one state explicitly prohibiting juries from considering noneconomic losses. Lay juries have considerably more freedom to award the promisee's noneconomic damages than the hornbooks would have us believe. We substantiate this claim with an online survey experiment asking respondents about a common contract case, and instructing them using the differing pattern forms. We found that subjects routinely awarded more …