Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 5 of 5

Full-Text Articles in Law

Brief Of Reporter And Advisers To Restatement (Third) Restitution And Unjust Enrichment, As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent, Doug Rendleman, Douglas Laycock Nov 2011

Brief Of Reporter And Advisers To Restatement (Third) Restitution And Unjust Enrichment, As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondent, Doug Rendleman, Douglas Laycock

Scholarly Articles

Restitution may be a casualty in a collision with the constitutional law of standing. Article III is traditionally said to require an “injury in fact” for standing to be a plaintiff in federal court. Edwards, who alleges that First American paid a bribe or kickback in violation of the federal Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, seeks to recover the statutory penalty. Defendant argues that even if it violated the Act, Edwards suffered no “injury in fact.” Our amicus brief in support of Edwards alerts the Supreme Court to the many restitutionary claims either for a wrongdoer’s profits or to set …


A Primer On Antitrust Damages, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Mar 2011

A Primer On Antitrust Damages, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper considers the theory of antitrust damages and then discusses some simple models for proving them. Antitrust damages theory begins with the premise that many practices alleged to violate the antitrust laws cause no consumer harm. Others are inefficient and have few socially redeeming virtues. Still others may simultaneously increase both the efficiency of the participants and their market power. A perfectly designed antitrust policy would exonerate the first set of practices, condemn the second set, and condemn the third set only when the social cost of the restraint exceeds its social value or they produce net harm to …


Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Feb 2011

Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.

In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states …


Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking The Theory Of Damages In A Market Economy, Steven L. Schwarcz Jan 2011

Compensating Market Value Losses: Rethinking The Theory Of Damages In A Market Economy, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The BP Deepwater Horizon spill and the Toyota car recalls have highlighted an important legal anomaly that has been overlooked by scholars — judicial inconsistency and confusion in ruling whether to compensate for the loss in market value of wrongfully affected property. This article seeks to understand the anomaly and, in the process, to build a stronger foundation for enabling courts to decide when — and in what amounts — to award damages for market value losses. To that end, the Article analyzes the normative rationales for generally awarding damages, adapting those rationales to derive a theory of damages that …


Notice And Patent Remedies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp Jan 2011

Notice And Patent Remedies, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

In private enforcement systems such as the one for patents, remedies perform the “public” function of determining the optimal amount of protection and deterrence. If every patent were properly granted and had just the right scope to incentivize innovation, then strict enforcement and harsh penalties for infringement would be a good idea. But in a world where too many patents are granted, their boundaries are often ambiguous and scope excessive, things are not so simple. The expected likelihood and magnitude of the penalty determines the number of infringement suits and the litigation resources that will be poured into them. As …