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Full-Text Articles in Law

Sequencing In Damages, Edward K. Cheng, Ehud Guttel, Yuval Procaccia Jan 2022

Sequencing In Damages, Edward K. Cheng, Ehud Guttel, Yuval Procaccia

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Tort law contains multiple doctrines governing the assignment of liability and the calculation of damages. But in what sequence should courts apply these doctrines? Does it matter, for example, whether a court applies comparative fault before or after mitigation of damages? The answer, rather surprisingly, is that sequencing does matter, and it can substantially affect the compensation that a tort victim ultimately receives. Yet the existing case law on sequencing is ad hoc, inconsistent, and undertheorized, and the issue has been entirely overlooked by the academic literature. In this Article, we introduce and examine the question of sequencing. We offer …


Taming Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, W. Kip Viscusi, Benjamin J. Mcmichael Jan 2019

Taming Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, W. Kip Viscusi, Benjamin J. Mcmichael

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Blockbuster punitive damages awards, i.e., those awards exceeding $100 million, attract attention based on their sheer size. While there have been fewer such awards in the last decade, they remain an important presence in the legal landscape. Taking notice of these and other large punitive damages awards, courts and state policymakers have taken steps to both constrain them and render them more predictable. States have enacted punitive damages caps to limit the amount of punitive damages courts can award, but these caps often contain a number of exceptions and apply only to damages under a specific state’s law. At a …


The Myth Of The Condorcet Winner, Paul H. Edelman Jan 2015

The Myth Of The Condorcet Winner, Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

There is consensus among legal scholars that, when choosing among multiple alternatives, the Condorcet winner, should it exist, is the preferred option. In this essay I will refute that claim, both normatively and positively. In addition, I will suggest that a different approach, based in behavioral economics, might be a more productive way to model the choices that legislatures make among multiple alternatives.


Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, Joni Hersch, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2010

Saving Lives Through Punitive Damages, Joni Hersch, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This Article proposes that the value of statistical life ("VSL ") be used to set the total damages amount needed for deterrence when punitive damages are warranted in wrongful death cases. The appropriate level of total damages should be achieved by adjusting the value of punitive damages. Compensatory damages should not be distorted to establish the total damages level needed for efficient deterrence. Attempts to introduce hedonic damages as a compensatory damages component, and proposals to use the VSL on a routine basis when setting compensatory damages awards, are misguided and will undermine the insurance and compensation functions of compensatory …


The End Of Objector Blackmail?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick Jan 2009

The End Of Objector Blackmail?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Courts and commentators have long been concerned with holdout problems in the law. This Article focuses on a holdout problem in class action litigation known as objector “blackmail.” Objector blackmail occurs when individual class members delay the final resolution of class action settlements by filing meritless appeals in the hope of inducing class counsel to pay them a side settlement to drop their appeals. It is thought that class counsel pay these side settlements because they cannot receive their fee awards until all appeals from the settlement are resolved. Although several solutions to the blackmail problem have been proposed, both …


What Are We Comparing In Comparative Negligence?, Paul H. Edelman Jan 2007

What Are We Comparing In Comparative Negligence?, Paul H. Edelman

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In tort cases, comparative negligence now is the dominant method for determining damages. Under that method, the jury apportions fault among the parties and assesses damages in proportion to the relative fault assessment. Comparative negligence contrasts with contributory negligence, where any fault attributed to the plaintiff bars recovery. Although comparative negligence routinely governs in tort cases, its most basic feature remains uncertain: how to apportion fault. In this Article, I demonstrate that at least two different methods exist, and that these methods lead to radically different outcomes. I create a framework, building on a traditional model from law and economics, …


The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2004

The Blockbuster Punitive Damages Awards, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This paper provides an analysis of 64 punitive damages awards of at least $100 million. Based on an inventory of these cases, there is evidence that these blockbuster awards are highly concentrated geographically, as two states account for 27 of the 64 awards. The awards also have been rising substantially over time, with the majority of these blockbuster awards taking place since 1999. An assessment of the current status of the blockbuster punitive damages awards indicates that most of these awards have been appealed, but the reversal of these punitive damages awards is the exception rather than the rule. Many …


Punitive Damages: How Judges And Juries Perform, Joni Hersch, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2004

Punitive Damages: How Judges And Juries Perform, Joni Hersch, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This paper presents the first empirical anatysis that demonstrates that juries differ from judges in awarding punitive damages. Our review of punitive damages awards of $100 million or more identified 63 such awards, of which juries made 95 percent. These jury awards are highly unpredictable and are not significantly correlated with compensatory damages. Using data on jury and bench verdicts from the Civil Justice Survey of State Courts, 1996, we find that juries are significantly more likely to award punitive damages than are judges and award higher levels of punitive damages. Jury awards are also less strongly related to compensatory …


Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail To Promote Efficiency, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2002

Punitive Damages: How Jurors Fail To Promote Efficiency, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Evidence of corporate risk-cost balancing often leads to inefficient punitive damages awards, suggesting that jurors fail to base their decision making on principles of economic efficiency. In this Article, Professor Viscusi presents the results of two experiments regarding jury behavior and punitive damages. In the first experiment, Professor Viscusi found that mock jurors punish companies for balancing risk against cost, although award levels vary depending on how the economic analysis is presented at trial. The results of the second experiment suggested that mock jurors are unwilling or unable to follow a set of model jury instructions designed to generate efficient …


Juries, Hindsight, And Punitive Damages Awards: Reply To Richard Lempert, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 2002

Juries, Hindsight, And Punitive Damages Awards: Reply To Richard Lempert, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Richard Lempert, a Professor of Law and Sociology at the University of Michigan criticized our recent article on judge and jury performance of a punitive damage judgment task, calling it a "failure of a social science case for change." Professor Lempert's depiction of our research is confusing and incorrect. However, because we believe a reading of only the Lempert critique can lead to a substantial misunderstanding of our research and its implications, we have written a reply.


What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance As A Risk Manager, W. Kip Viscusi, Reid Hastie Jan 1998

What Juries Can't Do Well: The Jury's Performance As A Risk Manager, W. Kip Viscusi, Reid Hastie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Can juries handle complex cases? One way to frame this question in behavioral science terms is to ask: What tasks can juries perform well and what tasks will they perform poorly? Our basic precept is that the legal system should ask juries to perform tasks that they are good at performing and should not require juries to carry out tasks that they cannot perform well. A second guiding theme in our approach to the issue of jury competency is that the most relevant, most useful analyses of jury performance are based on empirical observations and data, not on rational analyses …


Why There Is No Defense Of Punitive Damages, W. Kip Viscusi Jan 1998

Why There Is No Defense Of Punitive Damages, W. Kip Viscusi

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

This paper is a response to the comments by David Luban and Theodore Eisenberg on my article on punitive damages to be published in the Georgetown Law Journal (1998) and entitled "The Social Costs of Punitive Damages against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Tort." Neither of these authors presents any evidence indicating that there is a determent effect of punitive damages. They suggest, however, that there could be retribution objectives or other rationales for punitive damages. In addition, they claim that punitive damages are predictable and that cognitive biases may not tilt juries against corporations. This paper reviews these diverse …


Psychology, Economics, And Settlement: A New Look At The Role Of The Lawyer, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin Jan 1997

Psychology, Economics, And Settlement: A New Look At The Role Of The Lawyer, Chris Guthrie, Russell Korobkin

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Law and economics models of litigation settlement, based on the behavioral assumptions of rational choice theory, ignore the many psychological reasons that settlement negotiations can fail, yet they accurately predict that vast majority of lawsuits will settle short of formal adjudication. What explains this? We present experimental data that suggests lawyers might evaluate the settlement vs. adjudication decision from a perspective more closely akin to "rational choice theory" than will non-lawyers and, consequently, increase the observed level of settlement. We then evaluate whether the hypothesized difference between lawyers and non-lawyers is likely to lead to more efficient dispute resolution, concluding …