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Full-Text Articles in Law
Trial And Settlement: A Study Of High-Low Agreements, J. J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier, Albert Yoon
Trial And Settlement: A Study Of High-Low Agreements, J. J. Prescott, Kathryn E. Spier, Albert Yoon
Articles
This article presents the first systematic theoretical and empirical study of highlow agreements in civil litigation. A high-low agreement is a private contract that, if signed by litigants before trial, constrains any plaintiff’s recovery to a specified range. In our theoretical model, trial is both costly and risky. When litigants have divergent subjective beliefs and are mutually optimistic about their trial prospects, cases may fail to settle. In these cases, high-low agreements can be in litigants’ mutual interest because they limit the risk of outlier awards while still allowing mutually beneficial speculation. Using claims data from a national insurance company, …
The Future Of Classwide Punitive Damages, Catherine M. Sharkey
The Future Of Classwide Punitive Damages, Catherine M. Sharkey
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Conventional wisdom holds that the punitive damages class action is susceptiblenot only to doctrinal restraints imposed on class actions but also to constitutionaldue process limitations placed on punitive damages. Thus, it would seem that theprospects for punitive damages classes are even grimmer than for class actionsgenerally.This conventional picture misunderstands the role of punitive damages and, inparticular, the relationship between class actions and punitive damages. It eitherignores or underestimates the distinctly societal element of punitive damages, whichmakes them especially conducive to aggregate treatment. Furthermore, punitivedamages classes offer a solution to the constitutional due process problem of juriesawarding "classwide" damages in a …
Access To Consumer Remedies In The Squeaky Wheel System, Amy J. Schmitz
Access To Consumer Remedies In The Squeaky Wheel System, Amy J. Schmitz
Faculty Publications
This article explores the “Squeaky Wheel System” (“SWS”) in business-to-consumer (“B2C”) contexts, referring to merchants’ reservation of purchase remedies and other contract benefits for only the relatively few “squeaky wheel” consumers who have the requisite information and resources to persistently seek assistance. The article uncovers how this system fosters contractual discrimination and hinders consumers’ awareness and access with respect to contract remedies. It also adds empirical insights from my recent e-survey, and offers suggestions for using the internet to empower consumers of all economic and status levels with efficient and accessible means for learning about their purchase rights and asserting …
The Role Of "Stories" In Civil Jury Judgments, Reid Hastie
The Role Of "Stories" In Civil Jury Judgments, Reid Hastie
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
A brief review of psychological theories of juror decision making is followed by an introduction to "explanation-based" theories of judgment. Prior empirical studies of explanation-based processes in juror decision making are then reviewed. An original empirical study of jurors' judgments concerning liability for punitive damages is presented to illustrate the explanation-based approach to civil decisions.
Jury Trials In The Heartland, Stephen E. Chappelear
Jury Trials In The Heartland, Stephen E. Chappelear
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
In this Article, Stephen Chappelear draws on his study of civil jury trials in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in Columbus, Ohio. He concludes that trial by jury results in justice. Despite the popular belief that juries are modern day Robin Hoods, empirical data suggests that their verdicts are lower than commonly believed.
"Crimtorts" As Corporate Just Deserts, Thomas Koenig, Michael Rustad
"Crimtorts" As Corporate Just Deserts, Thomas Koenig, Michael Rustad
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Just as Grant Gilmore described "contorts" that lie on the borderline between contract and tort law, the authors coin the term "crimtort" to identify the expanding common ground between criminal and tort law. Although the concept of crimtort can be broadly applied to many areas of the law, this Article focuses on the primary crimtort remedy - punitive damages. The deterrent power of punitive damages lies in the wealth-calibration of the defendant's punishment. For corporations this means that punitive damages will reflect the firm's net income or net worth. The theoretical danger is that juries will abuse wealth by redistributing …
Corporate Judgement Proofing: A Response To Lynn Lopucki's 'The Death Of Liability', James J. White
Corporate Judgement Proofing: A Response To Lynn Lopucki's 'The Death Of Liability', James J. White
Articles
In "The Death of Liability" Professor Lynn M. LoPucki argues that American businesses are rendering themselves judgment proof.- Using the metaphor of a poker game, Professor LoPucki claims American businesses are increasingly able to participate in the poker game without putting "chips in the pot." He argues that it has become easier for American companies to play the game without having chips in the pot because of the ease with which a modern debtor can grant secured credit, because of the growth of the peculiar form of sale known as asset securitization, because foreign havens for secreting assets are now …
Going To Trial: A Rare Throw Of The Die, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Going To Trial: A Rare Throw Of The Die, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Articles
If it is true, as we often hear, that we are one of the most litigious societies on earth, it is because of our propensity to sue, not our affinity for trials. Of the hundreds of thousands of civil lawsuits that are filed each year in America, the great majority are settled; of those that are not settled, most are ultimately dismissed by the plaintiffs or by the courts; only a few percent are tried to a jury or a judge. This is no accident. We prefer settlements and have designed a system of civil justice that embodies and expresses …
Why Civil Cases Go To Trial: Strategic Bargaining And The Desire For Vindication, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Why Civil Cases Go To Trial: Strategic Bargaining And The Desire For Vindication, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Articles
When negotiations break down and a dispute cannot be settled, attorneys commonly blame their adversaries, often questioning their ethics or their judgment. After interviewing many attorneys, we have come to believe much of the criticism is directed at strategic moves in negotiation. But strategic ploys are not the only reason dispute resolution fails. Rather, our research also suggest that a genuine desire for vindication through trial or other formal process may be very significant in some types of cases where bargaining breaks down.
Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts In A System Geared To Settlement, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts In A System Geared To Settlement, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Articles
If it is true, as we often hear, that we are one of the most litigious societies on earth, it is because of our propensity to sue, not our affinity for trials. Of the hundreds of thousands of civil lawsuits that are filed each year in America, the great majority are settled; of those that are not settled, most are ultimately dismissed by the plaintiffs or by the courts; only a few percent are tried to a jury or a judge. This is no accident. We prefer settlements and have designed a system of civil justice that embodies and expresses …
Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud
Articles
A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial. More important, the nature of our civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in many cases, to agree …