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Delegation At The Founding: A Response To Critics, Julian Davis Mortenson, Nicholas Bagley
Delegation At The Founding: A Response To Critics, Julian Davis Mortenson, Nicholas Bagley
Articles
This essay responds to the wide range of commentary on Delegation at the Founding, published previously in the Columbia Law Review. The critics’ arguments deserve thoughtful consideration and a careful response. We’re happy to supply both. As a matter of eighteenth-century legal and political theory, “rulemaking” could not be neatly described as either legislative or executive based on analysis of its scope, subject, or substantive effect. To the contrary: Depending on the relationships you chose to emphasize, a given act could properly be classified as both legislative (from the perspective of the immediate actor) and also executive (from the perspective …
Radicals In Robes: A Review, Dru Stevenson
Radicals In Robes: A Review, Dru Stevenson
ExpressO
This essay reviews and critiques Cass Sunstein’s new book about conservative activists in the federal judiciary. After a discussion of Sunstein’s (somewhat misleading) rhetorical nomenclature, this essay argues that Sunstein’s proposed “minimalist” methodology in constitutional jurisprudence is beneficial, but not for the reasons Sunstein suggests. Sunstein alternatively justifies judicial restraint or incrementalism on epistemological self-doubt (cautiousness being an outgrowth of uncertainty) and his fear that accomplishments by Progressives in the last century will be undone by conservative judges in the present. Constitutional incrementalism is more convincingly justified on classical economic grounds. While affirming Sunstein’s overall thesis, this essay offers an …
Legislative Delegation And Two Conceptions Of The Legislative Power, Robert C. Sarvis
Legislative Delegation And Two Conceptions Of The Legislative Power, Robert C. Sarvis
The University of New Hampshire Law Review
[Excerpt] "The current federal government, with its burgeoning administrative agencies, does not embody what most Americans would recognize as the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. This is, in part, due to the Congress’s frequent practice of delegating legislative powers to the executive branch, i.e., giving administrative agencies the power to promulgate rules regulating private behavior and having the force of law. Legislative delegation has been the subject of academic, legal, and political wrangling since the early congresses and clearly calls into question whether modern practice adheres to constitutional norms. This article discusses legislative delegation in terms of some core …