Law Commons^™

The Support-Or-Advocacy Clauses, Richard Primus, Cameron O. Kistler

Articles

Two little known clauses of a Reconstruction-era civil rights statute are potentially powerful weapons for litigators seeking to protect the integrity of federal elections. For the clauses to achieve their potential, however, the courts will need to settle correctly a contested question of statutory interpretation: do the clauses create substantive rights, or do they merely create remedies for substantive rights specified elsewhere? The correct answer is that the clauses create substantive rights.

The Language Of Neutrality In Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, Carolyn Shapiro

Dickinson Law Review (2017-Present)

At Justice Neil Gorsuch’s confirmation hearing, then-Judge Gorsuch repeatedly insisted that judging involves no more than examining the legal materials—like statutes and precedents— and applying them to the facts of the case. There is, he emphasized, no room for a Justice’s “personal views,” and he refused even to state his agreement (or disagreement) with such iconic cases as Loving v. Virginia and Griswold v. Connecticut. Instead, then Judge Gorsuch reiterated only that they were precedents of the Court and thus entitled to respect. Frustrating as his answers may have been to some senators, however, they differed from answers given …

The Commonwealth Of Puerto Rico: Trying To Gain Dignity And Maintain Culture, Arnold Leibowitz

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Language Rights As A Legacy Of The Civil Rights Act Of 1964, Ming Hsu Chen

Publications

The fiftieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 offers an important opportunity to reflect on an earlier moment when civil rights evolved to accommodate new waves of immigration. This essay seeks to explain how civil rights laws evolved to include rights for immigrants and non-English speakers. More specifically, it seeks to explain how policy entrepreneurs in agencies read an affirmative right to language access.

Commerce In The Commerce Clause: A Response To Jack Balkin, Robert G. Natelson

Michigan Law Review First Impressions

The Constitution's original meaning is its meaning to those ratifying the document during a discrete time period: from its adoption by the Constitutional Convention in late 1787 until Rhode Island's ratification on May 29, 1790. Reconstructing it requires historical skills, including a comprehensive approach to sources. Jack Balkin's article Commerce fails to consider the full range of evidence and thereby attributes to the Constitution's Commerce Clause a scope that virtually no one in the Founding Era believed it had.

Literature And The Arts As Antisubordination Praxis: Latcrit Theory And Cultural Production: The Confessions Of An Accidental Crit, Pedro A. Malavet

UF Law Faculty Publications

I attend LatCrit conferences to be educated on what I regard as the most exciting legal scholarship being produced today. Therefore, I naturally jumped at the opportunity to help organize the Fourth Annual LatCrit Conference and to chair one of its Plenary Panels. I have penned this Essay for the purpose not only of joining Critical Race Theory ("CRT") discourse, but also to create a recorded history of LatCrit travels.

In Part I of this Essay, I will describe the process that led the Planning Committee to include the Literature and Arts as Antisubordination Praxis: LatCrit Theory and Cultural Production …

Law's Territory (A History Of Jurisdiction), Richard T. Ford

Michigan Law Review

Pop quiz: New York City. The United Kingdom. The East Bay Area Municipal Utilities District. Kwazulu, South Africa. The Cathedral of Notre Dame. The State of California. Vatican City. Switzerland. The American Embassy in the U.S.S.R. What do the foregoing items have in common? Answer: they are, or were, all territorial jurisdictions. A thesis of this Article is that territorial jurisdictions - the rigidly mapped territories within which formally defined legal powers are exercised by formally organized governmental institutions - are relatively new and intuitively surprising technological developments. New, because until the development of modern cartography, legal authority generally followed …

Theorists' Belief: A Comment On The Moral Tradition Of American Constitutionalism, Jospeh Vining

Articles

The Moral Tradition of American Constitutionalism is one of those rare works that leads us to face, at the center of law and legal thought, the largest questions about human life and human purpose. There is a special reader's shudder, a certain gestural shift in the chair, reserved for that moment of realizing where one is being led-not to the edge, but to the center, so that the questions become insistent, and whatever we and others say and do in the face of them becomes our response to them.

The Constitution's Accommodation Of Social Change, Philip A. Hamburger

Michigan Law Review

Did the framers and ratifiers of the United States Constitution think that changes in American society would require changes in the text or interpretation of the Constitution? If those who created the Constitution understood or even anticipated the possibility of major social alterations, how did they expect constitutional law - text and interpretation - to accommodate such developments?

The effect of social change upon constitutional law was an issue the framers and ratifiers frequently discussed. For example, when AntiFederalists complained of the Constitution's failure to protect the jury trial in civil cases, Federalists responded that a change of circumstances might, …

Constructing A Constitution: 'Orginal Intention' In The Slave Cases, James Boyd White

Other Publications

The question how our Constitution is to be interpreted is a living one for us today, both in the scholarly and in the political domains. Professors argue about "interpretivism" and "originalism" in law journals, they study hermeneutics and deconstruction to determine whether or not interpretation is possible at all, and if so on what premises, and they struggle to create theories that will tell us both what we do in fact and what we ought to do. Politicians and public figures (including Attorney General Edwin Meese) talk in the newspapers and elsewhere about the authority of the "original intention of …

Lying Down Together: Law, Metaphor, And Theology, Jon M. Lipshultz

Michigan Law Review

A Review of Lying Down Together: Law, Metaphor, and Theology by Milner S. Ball

A Dissent From The Miranda Dissents: Some Comments On The 'New' Fifth Amendment And The Old 'Voluntariness' Test, Yale Kamisar

Book Chapters

If the several conferences and workshops (and many lunch conversations) on police interrogation and confessions in which I have participated this past summer are any indication, Miranda v. Arizona has evoked much anger and spread much sorrow among judges, lawyers and professors. In the months and years ahead, such reaction is likely to be translated into microscopic analyses and relentless, probing criticism of the majority opinion. During this period of agonizing appraisal and reappraisal, I think it important that various assumptions and assertions in the dissenting opinions do not escape attention.

The Prospet Of Liberty Or The View From Saint-Remy, Ralph M. Carson

Michigan Law Review

This celebration of the first century of the Michigan Law School recalls the vain endeavor of the Holy Roman Empire to keep the craft of the law out of the Americas. Que no passasen abogados ni procuradores a las Indias was a clause inserted by the Emperor Charles V into the capitulation of 1540 with Alvar Nunez which sanctioned the exploration of the River Plate. Perhaps it was the futility of lawyers which prompted the Imperial veto. Twenty years before, when the Governor of Cuba sought to halt Cortez with decrees of outlawry from Spain, his cunning captain Sandoval evaded …

Pecote': A Bit Of Legal Archaeology, Joseph H. Drake

Articles

In the case of Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273 (1684), the "bil was, that a horn, which time out of mind had gone along with the plaintiff's estate, and was delivered, to his ancestors in ancient times to hold their land by, might be delivered to him; upon which horn was the inscription, viz. pecote this horn to hold huy thy land." The bill was demurred to in that the plaintiff did not by his bill pretend to be entitled to this horn, either as executor or devisee; nor had he in his bill charged it to be an …