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Legal History

2007

Legal philosophy

Articles 1 - 3 of 3

Full-Text Articles in Law

Rights As Norms And As Ends, Gianluigi Palombella Jan 2007

Rights As Norms And As Ends, Gianluigi Palombella

Gianluigi Palombella

This article considers the narratives of law through the lens of the form-substance devide. Different legal theories have provided for opposite definitions of law, legal rules and individual rights, enhancing their identity as due to some substantive content or, on the contrary, to some formal-functional features. The form-substance antinomy reflects both institutional and theoretical reasons. It bears down on the relations envisaged among rights, norms and ends. Different conceptions of rights are best understood as a special articulation of those three terms, and offer different patterns for rights, depending on their relation-opposition with collective ends, ethical values, legislation. The following …


Reasons For Justice, Rights And Future Generations, Gianluigi Palombella Jan 2007

Reasons For Justice, Rights And Future Generations, Gianluigi Palombella

Gianluigi Palombella

This article focuses on some very "fundamental threats" to future generations' leaving, and considers whether most essential interests of future persons not to be harmed can be construed as rights, and in particular as human rights, as much as present persons'. The framework refers essentially to a conceptual grammar of justice. Moreover, it is suggested to articulate rights through the lens of "disposability" and "non-disposability" principles. Finally, the article shows the reasons for separating what we owe to future persons under the challenge of those threats for humanity, i.e. a matter of justice, from our right to hand down our …


On Hart's Ways: Law As Reason And As Fact, John M. Finnis Jan 2007

On Hart's Ways: Law As Reason And As Fact, John M. Finnis

Journal Articles

This address at the Hart Centenary Conference in Cambridge in July 2007 reflects on foundational elements in Hart's method in legal philosophy. It argues that his understanding of what it is to adopt an internal point of view was flawed by (a) inattention to the difference between descriptive history (or biography or detection) and descriptive general theory of human affairs, (b) inattention to practical reason as argument from premises, some factual but others normative (evaluative) in their content, and (c) relative inattention to the deliberations of law-makers as distinct from subjects of the law. These flaws contributed to a concept …