Law Commons^™

Political Dysfunction And The Election Of Donald Trump: Problems Of The U.S. Constitution's Presidency, David Orentlicher

Scholarly Works

In this article, Professor Orentlicher examines the Constitution's design for the executive branch. He argues that by opting for a single executive rather than a multi-person executive, the Constitution causes two serious problems-it fuels the high levels of partisan polarization that we see today, and it increases the likelihood of misguided presidential decision making. Drawing on the experience in other countries with executive power shared by multiple officials, he proposes a bipartisan executive.

Nevada Public Policy And Higher Education: The Roles Of The Legislature And The Board Of Regents Under The Nevada Constitution, Thomas B. Mcaffee, Justin James Mcaffee

Nevada Law Journal

No abstract provided.

Sacrifice And Sacred Honor: Why The Constitution Is A "Suicide Pact", Peter Brandon Bayer

Scholarly Works

Most legal scholars and elected officials embrace the popular clich6 that "the Constitution is not a suicide pact." Typically, those commentators extol the "Constitution of necessity," the supposition that Government, essentially the Executive, may take any action-may abridge or deny any fundamental right-to alleviate a sufficiently serious national security threat. The "Constitution of necessity" is wrong. This Article explains that strict devotion to the "fundamental fairness" principles of the Constitution's Due Process Clauses is America's utmost legal and moral duty, surpassing all other considerations, even safety, security and survival.

The analysis begins with the most basic premises: the definition of …

Popular Constitutionalism In The Civil War: A Trial Run, Daniel W. Hamilton

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.

A Symposium On The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism And Judicial Review; Introduction, Daniel W. Hamilton

Scholarly Works

No abstract provided.