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American Constitutionalism: Volume Ii: Rights & Liberties, Howard Gillman, Mark Graber, Keith Whittington

Mark Graber

Constitutionalism in the United States is not determined solely by decisions made by the Supreme Court. Moving beyond traditional casebooks, renowned scholars Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber, and Keith E. Whittington take a refreshingly innovative approach in American Constitutionalism. Organized according to the standard two-semester sequence--in which Volume I covers Structures of Government and Volume II covers Rights and Liberties--this text is unique in that it presents the material in a historical organization within each volume, as opposed to the typical issues-based organization.

Ensayos Sobre Derecho Comparado Y Constitución, Teresa M. G. Da Cunha Lopes

Teresa M. G. Da Cunha Lopes

No abstract provided.

American Constitutionalism: Volume I: Structures Of Government, Howard Gillman, Mark Graber, Keith Whittington

Mark Graber

Constitutionalism in the United States is not determined solely by decisions made by the Supreme Court. Moving beyond traditional casebooks, renowned scholars Howard Gillman, Mark A. Graber, and Keith E. Whittington take a refreshingly innovative approach in American Constitutionalism. Organized according to the standard two-semester sequence--in which Volume I covers institutions and Volume II covers Rights and Liberties-- this text is unique in that it presents the material in a historical organization within each volume, as opposed to the typical issues-based organization.

Disclosure's Effects: Wikileaks And Transparency, Mark Fenster

Mark Fenster

Plus Or Minus One: The Thirteenth And Fourteenth Amendments, Mark A. Graber

Mark Graber

The consensus that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Thirteenth Amendment has come under sharp criticism in recent years. Several new works suggest that the Thirteenth Amendment, properly interpreted, protects some substantive rights not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Some of this scholarship is undoubtedly motivated by an effort to avoid hostile Supreme Court precedents. Nevertheless, more seems to be going on than mere litigation strategy. Scholars detected different rights and regime principles in the Thirteenth Amendment than they find in the Fourteenth Amendment. The 2011 Maryland Constitutional Law Schoomze, to which this is an introduction, provided an opportunity for law …

The Long And Winding Road From Monroe To Connick, Sheldon Nahmod

Sheldon Nahmod

In this article, I address the historical and doctrinal development of § 1983 local government liability, beginning with Monroe v. Pape in 1961 and culminating in the Supreme Court’s controversial 2011 failure to train decision in Connick v. Thompson. Connick has made it exceptionally difficult for § 1983 plaintiffs to prevail against local governments in failure to train cases. In the course of my analysis, I also consider the oral argument and opinions in Connick as well as various aspects of § 1983 doctrine. I ultimately situate Connick in the Court’s federalism jurisprudence which doubles back to Justice Frankfurter’s view …

Washington Was Right: The Supreme Court Could Have Intervened To Interpret French Treaties, Kevin P. Chapman

Kevin P. Chapman

In the early days of his presidency, George Washington faced his first international crisis when French Ambassador Genet demanded that the United States honor its treaty obligations and provide support to the new French Republic in its ongoing war with Great Britain. Concerned about the legal effect that the French Revolution had on the viability of these obligations, Washington asked the Supreme Court to render an opinion. Chief Justice John Jay replied that the Constitution did not authorize the Supreme Court to render advisory opinions.

If Jay was correct, why did Washington, who presided over the very convention that produced …

Bad News For John Marshall, David B. Kopel, Gary Lawson

David B Kopel

In Bad News for Professor Koppelman: The Incidental Unconstitutionality of the Individual Mandate, we demonstrated that the individual mandate’s forced participation in commercial transactions cannot be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause as the Clause was interpreted in McCulloch v. Maryland. Professor Andrew Koppelman’s response, Bad News for Everybody, wrongly conflates that argument with a wide range of interpretative and substantive positions that are not logically entailed by taking seriously the requirement that laws enacted under the Necessary and Proper Clause must be incidental to an enumerated power. His response is thus largely unresponsive to our actual arguments.