Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
Articles 1 - 3 of 3
Full-Text Articles in Law
Rules, Story And Commitment In The Teaching Of Legal Ethics, Susan P. Koniak, Roger C. Cramton
Rules, Story And Commitment In The Teaching Of Legal Ethics, Susan P. Koniak, Roger C. Cramton
Faculty Scholarship
The ABA requires each "approved" law school to provide each student "instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal profession." First adopted in August, 1973, in the midst of the Watergate disclosures, this requirement has never been interpreted and is infrequently referred to or enforced in the accreditation process. The professional responsibility requirement is the only substantive teaching requirement imposed by the ABA.
Should the ethics teaching requirement be scrapped? We consider that question in Part I. Although we ultimately conclude the rule should be maintained, we believe this fundamental question must be asked. Given the disdain many legal …
Law And Ethics In A World Of Rights And Unsuitable Wrongs, Susan P. Koniak
Law And Ethics In A World Of Rights And Unsuitable Wrongs, Susan P. Koniak
Faculty Scholarship
Law, ethics and morality. What distinguishes these concepts? What connects them? Those are my questions. My argument is this. There is a traditional understanding of the relationship between law and ethics, and that understanding is inadequate as description. While passing as description, the traditional understanding of the relationship between law and ethics is instead normative. The normative message in the traditional understanding is worthy of examination and ripe for critique. This Article offers an alternative method of understanding the relationship between law and ethics and a normative examination of the old and new.
Comment On Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, And Professional Responsibility, Lance Liebman
Comment On Moliterno, Legal Education, Experiential Education, And Professional Responsibility, Lance Liebman
Faculty Scholarship
In attempting to predict and prescribe the future, my vision of the recent history of legal education differs from Professor Moliterno's in certain relevant ways.
I graduated from Law School in 1967. I learned largely through doctrinal courses that delivered steady training in thinking like a lawyer and information about areas of law. These courses exposed me and my classmates to legal lingo and to the standard types of legal arguments. We learned, largely by hearing the teacher and our fellow students, to make verbal moves and to see the strengths and limitations of others' argumentation skills and techniques. We …