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Full-Text Articles in Law
Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson
Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson
ExpressO
This paper investigates rational choice explanations for patterns of Supreme Court decision-making with respect to the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions. In particular, I assess empirically the thesis that the Supreme Court expands deference when the Supreme Court is ideologically closer to the executive than to the circuit courts, and contracts deference when the opposite is true. I find little to no evidence supporting this "rational choice" theory of judicial deference. Given this surprising null finding, I offer alternative explanations for the data and suggest directions for future research.
United States V. Bean: Shoveling After The Elephant., Pannal Alan Sanders
United States V. Bean: Shoveling After The Elephant., Pannal Alan Sanders
St. Mary's Law Journal
Over the years Congress has enacted and amended several versions of the United States Code (U.S.C) § 925(c). Several reported cases illustrate the courts’ early efforts to develop a coherent body of jurisprudence with respect to the procedural and substantive aspects of U.S.C. § 925(c) judicial review. Specifically, the § 925(c) denials of relief by the Director before the congressional appropriations ban commenced in 1993. Although the methodology and reasoning behind these decisions differ in their details, several themes are discernable. First, even without the express provisions for judicial review added by the Firearms Owners Protection Act (FOPA), courts consistently …