Law Commons^™

Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson

ExpressO

This paper investigates rational choice explanations for patterns of Supreme Court decision-making with respect to the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions. In particular, I assess empirically the thesis that the Supreme Court expands deference when the Supreme Court is ideologically closer to the executive than to the circuit courts, and contracts deference when the opposite is true. I find little to no evidence supporting this "rational choice" theory of judicial deference. Given this surprising null finding, I offer alternative explanations for the data and suggest directions for future research.

Procedural Fairness And Incentive Programs: Reflections On The Environmental Choice Program, David S. Cohen

Elisabeth Haub School of Law Faculty Publications

This paper explores the application of procedural fairness to the federal government’s Environmental Choice Program’s decision-making processes. While Canadian courts have traditionally required public bureaucrats to act “fairly” when implementing command models of regulation, they have only recently been confronted with demands that regulators implementing economic incentive programs also act in accordance with procedural fairness norms.

Can Ignorance Be Bliss? Imperfect Information As A Positive Influence In Political Insitutions, Michael A. Fitts

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Judicial Review Of Federal Administrative Action: Quest For The Optimum Forum, David P. Currie, Frank I. Goodman

All Faculty Scholarship

Professors Currie and Goodman present a comprehensive analysis of the variables that must be isolated and weighed in determining the optimum forum for judicial review of administrative action. While the backdrop for this study is the caseload crisis presently confronting the federal courts of appeals, their discussion illuminates the requsites for optimum judicial review generally.

Failing to perceive any compelling reason to single out administrative cases for review (in separate courts, the authors argue against the creation of special administrative appeals courts. Even if such courts were to enjoy broad subject matter jurisdiction over the most demanding aspects of the …