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Full-Text Articles in Law
Media Policy Out Of The Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, And The Failures Of Digital Markets, Ellen P. Goodman
Media Policy Out Of The Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, And The Failures Of Digital Markets, Ellen P. Goodman
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No abstract provided.
Securing Truth For Power: Informational Strategy And Regulatory Policy Making, Cary Coglianese
Securing Truth For Power: Informational Strategy And Regulatory Policy Making, Cary Coglianese
ExpressO
No abstract provided.
Innovation, Regulation And The Selection Environment, Timothy F. Malloy, Peter Sinsheimer
Innovation, Regulation And The Selection Environment, Timothy F. Malloy, Peter Sinsheimer
ExpressO
This article focuses on the question of how regulation can be best designed to encourage technological innovation. Most scholarship in this area applies standard economic analysis to evaluate the impact of various forms of regulation on technological innovation. We reject that approach as too narrow, drawing instead upon principles of evolutionary economics. The basic premise of the article is that a firm’s technology choices—and its response to regulation intended to shape those choices—are influenced by other actors (such as suppliers and competitors), by external social and legal institutions (e.g., industry standards and norms) and by the firms' internal structure (such …
The Continuing Showdown Over Who Should Regulate Amusement Attraction Safety: A Critical Analysis Of Why Fixed-Site Amusement Attraction Safety Should Remain State-Governed. , Chad Emerson
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No abstract provided.
Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson
Mixed Signals: Reconsidering The Political Economy Of Judicial Deference To Administrative Agencies, Matthew C. Stephenson
ExpressO
This paper investigates rational choice explanations for patterns of Supreme Court decision-making with respect to the appropriate level of judicial deference to administrative agency decisions. In particular, I assess empirically the thesis that the Supreme Court expands deference when the Supreme Court is ideologically closer to the executive than to the circuit courts, and contracts deference when the opposite is true. I find little to no evidence supporting this "rational choice" theory of judicial deference. Given this surprising null finding, I offer alternative explanations for the data and suggest directions for future research.