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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Law
Mental Budget: Inefficient Clauses Or Consumer Choices?, Enrico Baffi
Mental Budget: Inefficient Clauses Or Consumer Choices?, Enrico Baffi
enrico baffi
In this paper I aim to demonstrate that due the phenomenon of consumer mental accounting, it's not possible to consider money as fungible. Consumers decide to spend a certain amount of money for a kind of good and they are not willing to take some extra money from the jars that contain the money to spend for other goods. But consumers seem to have a sort of reserve which encompass efforts, time, and the possibility to bear risk that they use to save money and obtain a lower price for a good. To explain, a good can be delivered at …
The Problem Of Internalization Of Social Costs And The Ideas Of Ronadl Coase, Enrico Baffi
The Problem Of Internalization Of Social Costs And The Ideas Of Ronadl Coase, Enrico Baffi
enrico baffi
In this paper, I try to show that, although some arguments elaborated by Coase do not have a great practical importance, and that it seems that the most important one against a system of remedies for each externalities (if we are able to define this concept) is difficult to create, Coase has understood many problems that they have been at the basis of later studies in tort and property law; but, what is more important here, is to underline that a system of remedies for every externalities have been refused by eminent scholars after Coase The work of the English …
Contracting I The -Modern Woerld, Enrico Baffi
Contracting I The -Modern Woerld, Enrico Baffi
enrico baffi
In this paper I want to show that the change that we observe in the way of contracting do not depend by the market powers that firms would have obtained, but it is a phenomenon due to the change in relative costs of activities. There are activities that are labor intensive that must be abandoned in favor of activities that capital intensive, and there are activities that are time consuming that the people do not want to bea, as reading all the contract clauses of a standard form contract, that determine the necessity, probably, if there is not a state …
Contracting In Modern World, Enrico Baffi
Contracting In Modern World, Enrico Baffi
enrico baffi
In this paper I try explore some of the basic features of modern mass contracting. In my opinion, there are basically four characteristics of modern mass contracting: a)he reduced negotiations; b) the dissemination of standard form contracts; c) the presence of abusive clauses; d) and the recapitulation of the contract and its execution in a single act of stipulation. All the changes are the consequences in the changes of relative costs of activities: a) The reduction in negotiations is the result first of all of the costs that this activity requires and of the costs required to manage personalized contracts; …
Efficient Penalty Clauses With Debiasing: Lessons From Behavioral Law And Economics, Enrico Baffi
Efficient Penalty Clauses With Debiasing: Lessons From Behavioral Law And Economics, Enrico Baffi
enrico baffi
This paper builds upon the findings of cognitive psychology to revisit the prescriptive solutions proposed in the legal literature with respect to efficient penalty clauses. While refraining from generalizations regarding human behaviour, generalizations that might lead to positions quite removed from reality and in part ideological, as was the case with rational choice theory, the paper instead seeks to distinguish one situation from another in order to identify the existence of decision debiasing mechanisms capable of justifying - in the case of the set of rules in question - hypotheses in which lesser control over the penalty clause would be …
Mental Budget And Inefficient Clauses: A Lesson From Behavioral Law Nand Economics, Enrico Baffi
Mental Budget And Inefficient Clauses: A Lesson From Behavioral Law Nand Economics, Enrico Baffi
enrico baffi
This paper is an attempt to highlight how clauses, which are traditionally considered to be inefficient, may actually be desired by consumers. This anomaly originates in the fact that each individual builds a mental budget by dividing the money he has among the needs he intends to satisfy. According to consumers’ reasoning, money is not fungible, in the sense that amounts cannot be transferred from one expenditure to another. Consumers who behave in this way may sometimes find that they have depleted the amount they budgeted for an item while wanting to buy more of it. Since additional time, efforts …
Casev. Pigou: A Still Difficult Debate, Enrico Baffi
Casev. Pigou: A Still Difficult Debate, Enrico Baffi
enrico baffi
This paper examine the positions of Coase and Pigou about the problem of the externalities. From the reading of their most two important works it appears that Coase has a more relevant preference for a evaluation of efficiency at the total, while Pigou, with some exception, is convinced that is possible to reach marginal efficiency through taxes or compensation. It’s interesting that Coase, who has elaborated the famous theorem, is convinced that is not important to reach the efficiency at the margin every time and that sometimes is necessary a valuation at the total, that tells us which solution is …