Law Commons^™

Juries: Arbiters Or Arbitrary?, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

What The Knicks Debacle Of '97 Can Teach Students About The Nature Of Rules, Robert A. Hillman

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Are Housekeepers Like Judges?, Stephen P. Garvey

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Professor Greenawalt proposes that we look at interpretation "from the bottom up." By taking a close look at informal relationships between an authority and his or her agent, and how the agent "faithfully performs" instructions within such relationships, he hopes to gain insight into the problems surrounding the interpretation of legal directives. The analysis of "faithful performance" in informal contexts which Professor Greenawalt presents in From the Bottom Up is the first step in a larger project. His next step is to see what lessons the interpretation of instructions in informal contexts has for law. This Comment tries to contribute …

Limited-Domain Positivism As An Empirical Proposition, Stewart J. Schwab

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

In his typically clear statement of a provocative thesis, Fred Schauer, along with his co-author, Virginia Wise, ask us to think about positivism in a new way. Their claim has two parts. First, Schauer and Wise redefine legal positivism as an empirical claim about the limited domain of information that legal decisionmakers use to make decisions. Second, they begin testing the extent to which our legal system in fact reflects this limited domain. Ironically, Schauer and Wise believe that positivism, so conceived, is "increasingly false." Thus, their two-part approach is, first, to declare that legal positivism should be conceived of …