Law Commons^™

Ex Post Facto Laws: Supreme Court New York County People V. Griffin (Decided December 5, 1996

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Integrity And Universality: A Comment On Dworkin's Freedom's Law, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Ronald Dworkin has done more than any other constitutional lawyer, past or present, to impress upon us the importance of integrity to constitutional law, and hence to our shared public life. Far from being merely a private virtue, Dworkin has shown that integrity imposes constraints upon and provides guidance to the work of judges in constitutional cases: Every constitutional case that comes before a court must be decided by recourse to the same moral principles that have dictated results in relevant similar cases in the past. Any group or individual challenging the constitutionality of legislation which adversely affects his or …

Writing In The Margins: Brennan, Marshall, And The Inherent Weaknesses Of Liberal Judicial Decision-Making Essay., Donna F. Coltharp

St. Mary's Law Journal

From 1967, when Thurgood Marshall took his seat as Supreme Court Justice, until 1990, when William Brennan, Jr. vacated his seat, the two Justices formed one of the most consistent liberal voting blocs in the history of the Court. Both Justices were judicial activists who labored in the tradition of Legal Realism. Although both Brennan and Marshall recognized the interpretation and application of the law as purposeful exercises, they differed in their approach to the task. Marshall, for instance, appealed to social consensus stating that his views were supported by society. Furthermore, Marshall strongly believed that the Constitution is a …

Interpretation And Judgment, Kent Greenawalt

Faculty Scholarship

The major conclusions in Georgia Warnke's illuminating Essay, Law, Hermeneutics, and Public Debate are persuasive, but some that appear almost self-evident instead rest on controversial evaluative judgments. Many of my comments deal with these complexities, drawing from her book on interpretation and political theory as well as her Essay. Other remarks develop subjects Warnke barely touches. My thoughts are, thus, some combination of clarification, supplementation, and disagreement.

My initial effort is to refine in just what senses interpretations of texts, social practices, and legal rules must speak to our concerns. I next explore how interpretations of legal texts that are …