Law Commons^™

Beyond Algorithms: Toward A Normative Theory Of Automated Regulation, Felix Mormann

Faculty Scholarship

The proliferation of artificial intelligence in our daily lives has spawned a burgeoning literature on the dawn of dehumanized, algorithmic governance. Remarkably, the scholarly discourse overwhelmingly fails to acknowledge that automated, non-human governance has long been a reality. For more than a century, policymakers have relied on regulations that automatically adjust to changing circumstances, without the need for human intervention. This article surveys the track record of self-adjusting governance mechanisms to propose a normative theory of automated regulation.

Effective policymaking frequently requires anticipation of future developments, from technology innovation to geopolitical change. Self-adjusting regulation offers an insurance policy against the …

Inventing The Classical Constitution, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

One recurring call over a century of American constitutional thought is for return to a "classical" understanding of American federal and state Constitutions. "Classical" does not necessarily mean "originalist" or "interpretivist." Some classical views, such as the attempt to revitalize Lochner-style economic due process, find little support in the text of the federal Constitution or any of the contemporary state constitutions. Rather, constitutional meaning is thought to lie in a background link between constitution formation and classical statecraft. The core theory rests on the assumption of a social contract to which everyone in some initial position agreed. Like any contract, …

Interest Groups In The Teaching Of Legal History, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

All Faculty Scholarship

One reason legal history is more interesting than it was several decades ago is the increased role of interest groups in our accounts of legal change. Diverse movements including law and society, critical legal theory, comparative law, and public choice theory have promoted this development, even among writers who are not predominantly historians. Nonetheless, in my own survey course in American legal history I often push back. Taken too far, interest group theorizing becomes an easy shortcut for assessing legal movements and developments without fully understanding the ideas behind them.

Intellectual history in the United States went into decline because …

The Hidden Function Of Takings Compensation, Abraham Bell, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

To date, scholars have justified the constitutional mandate to pay compensation for takings of property on the intuitively appealing grounds that fairness demands recompensing aggrieved owners; on the basis of a belief that government that fails to pay will suffer from “fiscal illusion” and take excessively; or due to the need to neutralize politically powerful property owners who would otherwise foil socially beneficial projects. This Essay offers a new explanation of the role of takings compensation in ensuring good government. Inspired by public choice theory, we argue that takings compensation is intended to reduce the incentives for corruption by limiting …

Why Kelo Is Not Good News For Local Planners And Developers, Daniel H. Cole

Articles by Maurer Faculty

When the Supreme Court announced its 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London, few legal scholars were surprised at the outcome, which was premised on precedents extending back to the middle of the 19th century. Legal scholars were surprised, however, by the intense political reaction to Kelo (fueled substantially by Justice O'Connor's hyperbolic dissent), as property-rights advocates, legislators (at all levels of government), and media pundits assailed the ruling as a death knell for private property rights in America.

Kelo's combination of relative legal insignificance and high political salience makes it an interesting case study in cross-institutional dynamics, …