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Full-Text Articles in Law
Be Careful What You Wish For? Reducing Inequality In The Twenty-First Century, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Orli K. Avi-Yonah
Be Careful What You Wish For? Reducing Inequality In The Twenty-First Century, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Orli K. Avi-Yonah
Michigan Law Review
A review of Walter Scheidel, The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century.
Male Sexuality: Why Ownership Is Sexy, John Stoltenberg
Male Sexuality: Why Ownership Is Sexy, John Stoltenberg
Michigan Journal of Gender & Law
What I want to address is what I call the eroticism of owning. We have a lot of circumstantial evidence that this eroticism exists. For instance, based on the testimony of women who are or have been sexually owned in marriage, taken in rape, and/or sexually used for a fee in prostitution, it appears that for many men, possession is a principal part of their sexual behavior. Many men can scarcely discern any erotic feelings that are not associated with owning someone else's body.
Economics And Law: Two Cultures In Tension, James Boyd White
Economics And Law: Two Cultures In Tension, James Boyd White
Articles
I want to preface my remarks by saying something about the kind of talk this is going to be. As my title says, I shall speak mainly about economics and law, which I shall examine as forms of thought and life, or what I shall call cultures. With law, about which in fact I shall speak rather briefly, I am naturally familiar by training and experience. But with economics I am familiar only as an observer as a general reader who reads the newspaper, as a lawyer who has followed a little of the law and economics literature, and as …
The Legalization Of American Society: Economic Regulation, Peter O. Steiner
The Legalization Of American Society: Economic Regulation, Peter O. Steiner
Michigan Law Review
My central thesis is that regulation may be insightfully classified into three broad types of response to perceived market failure, and I will merely touch examples of each. The first is protection of competitive results. I shall focus on natural monopoly regulation, although anti-trust would do as well. The second is protection from competitive results, such as entry control and setting of minimum prices. The third is regulation of externalities such as pollution and accidents arising as byproducts of more usual production.