Law Commons^™

Serving Only To Oppress: An Intersectional And Critical Race Analysis Of Constitutional Originalism Inflicting Harm, Ethan Dawson

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality

“[T]imes can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress.” - Justice Anthony Kennedy, Lawrence v. Texas (2003)

This Note will first focus on a historical analysis of originalist constitutional interpretation, drawing attention to initial disparities in the Constitution incompatible with our current social context. It will discuss modern originalism as a method of perpetuating systemic shortcomings, drawing specific attention to originalist interpretation as a method of oppression against white women and people of color, specifically Black women. In analyzing the harm originalism does to …

A Modern-Day 3/5 Compromise: The Case For Finding Prison Gerrymandering Unconstitutional Under The Thirteenth Amendment, Shana Iden

Fordham Law Voting Rights and Democracy Forum

Vestiges of slavery and systemic disenfranchisement of people of color persist in the United States. One of these remnants is the practice of prison gerrymandering, which occurs when government officials count incarcerated individuals as part of the population of the prison’s location rather than the individual’s home district. This Article argues that prison gerrymandering functions as a badge of slavery that should be prohibited under the Thirteenth Amendment.

First, this Article provides background on prison gerrymandering and charts its impact through history, particularly on Black communities. Moreover, this Article analyzes how litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment has not yielded meaningful …

Methodological Gerrymandering, David Simson

Articles & Chapters

The U.S. Supreme Court has come to decide many of the most consequential and contentious aspects of social policy via its interpretations of the U.S. Constitution. Institutional features of the Court create significant pressure on the Justices to justify their decisions as applications of “law” rather than the practice of “politics.” Their perceived failure to do so calls forth criticism sounding in a variety of registers—ranging from allegations of a lack of neutrality, lack of impartiality, or lack of “principle,” to allegations of opportunism, disingenuousness, and hypocrisy. Analyzing the Justices’ choices in relation to interpretational “methodology”—choosing one lens through which …