Law Commons^™

The Market As Negotiation, Rebecca E. Hollander-Blumoff, Matthew T. Bodie

Scholarship@WashULaw

Our economic system counts on markets to allocate most of our societal resources. The law often treats markets as discrete entities, with a native intelligence and structure that provides clear answers to questions about prices and terms. In reality, of course, markets are much messier—they are agglomerations of negotiations by individual parties. Despite theoretical and empirical work on markets and on negotiation, legal scholars have largely overlooked the connection between the two areas in considering how markets are constructed and regulated.

This Article brings together scholarship in law, economics, sociology, and psychology to better understand the role that negotiation plays …

Managing Inner And Outer Conflict: Selves, Subpersonalities, And Internal Family Systems, Leonard L. Riskin

UF Law Faculty Publications

This article describes potential benefits of considering certain processes within an individual that take place in connection with external conflict as if they might be negotiations or other processes that are routinely used to address external disputes, such as mediation or adjudication. In order to think about internal processes in this way, it is necessary to employ a model of the mind that includes entities capable of engaging in such processes. The Internal Family Systems (IFS) model, developed by Richard C. Schwartz, works well for this purpose. The IFS model is grounded on the construct that the mind is composed …

The Role Of Equipoise In Family Law, Deborah Cantrell

Publications

Scholars reviewing family law over the last twenty years have described the field as having undergone a revolution. While true, both scholars and front-line family law advocates have failed to invent a satisfying end to the revolution. This Article takes up that challenge and offers a novel way forward, It identifies two translation challenges that have prevented the revolution from reaching its end. The first challenge is translating reform so that its benefits accrue equally across all kinds of participants--rich and poor, those with lawyers and those without. The second challenge is translating theory into on-the-ground practices useful to family …

On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow

Articles

It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions. In settings where these costs are high, parties might find themselves "stuck" in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. The strong version of this account-that the only factor that can make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a tailored provision-has been gradually reappraised. It is by now recognized that factors beyond …

Action Science And Negotiation, Michael Moffitt, Scott R. Peppet

Publications

No abstract provided.

Using Bargaining For Advantage In Law School Negotiation Courses, Chris Guthrie

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

Options, options, options ....The Negotiation literature-at least the "problem-solving" or "interestbased" or "principled" negotiation literature'repeats this mantra over and over and over. It seems self-evident that having lots of options is a good idea because more options means more to choose from. The more options there are to choose from, however, the more difficult choosing can be. Options, in short, may increase the likelihood that one will make an optimal decision, but they impose added "decision costs" on the decision maker. Law professors now face this happy dilemma when choosing materials for their Negotiation courses. Options abound-including the negotiation chapters …

Getting To No: A Study Of Settlement Negotiations And The Selection Of Cases For Trial, Samuel R. Gross, Kent D. Syverud

Articles

A trial is a failure. Although we celebrate it as the centerpiece of our system of justice, we know that trial is not only an uncommon method of resolving disputes, but a disfavored one. With some notable exceptions, lawyers, judges, and commentators agree that pretrial settlement is almost always cheaper, faster, and better than trial. Much of our civil procedure is justified by the desire to promote settlement and avoid trial. More important, the nature of our civil process drives parties to settle so as to avoid the costs, delays, and uncertainties of trial, and, in many cases, to agree …

Review Of Better Settlements -- Through Leverage, By P. J. Hermann. , James J. White

Reviews

Who ever learned to negotiate from a book? Probably no one, and one who seeks the kernel of wisdom which will make him an expert negotiator, who seeks the password for admittance to the negotiator's sanctum sanctorum-that person will hunt in vain through the pages of Mr. Hermann's book. I do not mean to suggest either that Mr. Hermann has withheld something in his power to reveal or that he has explicitly promised such a revelation. Rather, I suggest a flaw either in our perception and analysis or in our verbal skills. One of them, probably our perception and analysis, …