Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Publication
Articles 1 - 4 of 4
Full-Text Articles in Law
Regulation, Deregulation, And Happiness, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Regulation, Deregulation, And Happiness, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
Happiness, in general, is in many respects the topic du jour. A great deal of theoretical and empirical work has been devoted to dissecting it. Studies of happiness have crossed over to law, and the result is an addition to the long list of the list of “law and” interdisciplinary areas. In fact, in 2010, Eric Posner and Matthew Alder presented an excellent book of readings the title of which is Law and Happiness. Peter Henry Huang has written the definitive survey of law and happiness literature. My own writing has reflected on the promise of happiness research and the …
Happiness, Efficiency, And The Promise Of Decisional Equity: From Outcome To Process, Jeffrey L. Harrison
Happiness, Efficiency, And The Promise Of Decisional Equity: From Outcome To Process, Jeffrey L. Harrison
UF Law Faculty Publications
This article explains why outcome-oriented goals like efficiency, happiness, or well-being are ultimately of limited use as goals for law. Part II places happiness research in the context of past efforts to assess efficiency standards. Part III outlines the schism between efficiency and happiness and examines whether they can be reconciled. Part IV discusses the problems of relying on direct measures of happiness. The concept of decisional equity is described and examined in Part V.
On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow
On The Stickiness Of Default Rules, Omri Ben-Shahar, John A. E. Pottow
Articles
It was once perceived, and still is commonly taught, that default rules in contract law must mimic efficient arrangements. Otherwise, these rules impose needless transaction costs upon parties who seek to opt out of them to reach more efficient positions. In settings where these costs are high, parties might find themselves "stuck" in a default, unable to reach the outcome that they prefer. The strong version of this account-that the only factor that can make an inefficient default rule stick is the direct cost of drafting a tailored provision-has been gradually reappraised. It is by now recognized that factors beyond …
Behavioral Economics And The Sec, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard
Behavioral Economics And The Sec, Stephen J. Choi, Adam C. Pritchard
Articles
Not all investors are rational. Quite apart from the obvious examples of credulity in the face of the latest Ponzi scheme, there is no shortage of evidence that many investors' decisions are influenced by systematic biases that impair their abilities to maximize their investment returns. For example, investors will often hold onto poorly performing stocks longer than warranted, hoping to recoup their losses. Other investors will engage in speculative trading, dissipating their returns by paying larger commissions than more passive investors. And we are not just talking about widows and orphans here. There is evidence that supposedly sophisticated institutional investors-mutual …