Law Commons^™

In Consumer Protection We Trust? Re-Thinking The Legal Framework For Country Of Origin Cases, Shmuel I. Becher, Jessica C. Lai

San Diego Law Review

Markets are becoming more complicated in an ever faster changing world. New findings pertaining to human behavior and consumer markets constantly challenge traditional legal and policy assumptions. Social science offers a myriad of insights into the ways trust, identity, ideology, and preferences interact and impact one another. Against this background, the need to advance a nuanced legal framework is increasingly vital.

Consumer law policy requires an interdisciplinary and holistic approach. Recent scholarship has acknowledged this need, proposing novel ways to enrich the academic discourse and develop consumer law policy. Along these lines, a growing body of literature examines how notions …

Parity At A Price: The Emerging Professional Liability Of Mental Health Providers, Thomas L. Hafemeister, Leah G. Mclaughlin, Jessica Smith

San Diego Law Review

This Article considers the issues associated with emerging professional liability claims against mental health care providers. Part II supplies background information regarding this liability, including the elements of these claims. Part III details the decreasing stigma associated with obtaining mental health services and its impact on professional liability, while Part IV summarizes advancements in mental health treatment that have enhanced the functional capacities of potential litigants. The remaining Parts explore changes in the delivery of mental health care where litigation may be focused, including the increasing use of psychotropic medications (Part V), the expanding role of primary care physicians and …

Dangerous Psychopaths: Criminally Responsible But Not Morally Responsible, Subject To Criminal Punishment And To Preventive Detention, Ken Levy

San Diego Law Review

How should we judge psychopaths, both morally and in the criminal justice system? This Article will argue that psychopaths are often not morally responsible for their bad acts simply because they cannot understand, and therefore be guided by, moral reasons.

Scholars and lawyers who endorse the same conclusion automatically tend to infer from this premise that psychopaths should not be held criminally punishable for their criminal acts. These scholars and lawyers are making this assumption (that just criminal punishment requires moral responsibility) on the basis of one of two deeper assumptions: that either criminal punishment directly requires moral responsibility or …