Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Law Commons

Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®

Articles 1 - 6 of 6

Full-Text Articles in Law

Autonomy And The Folk Concept Of Valid Consent, Joanna Demaree-Cotton, Roseanna Sommers Aug 2021

Autonomy And The Folk Concept Of Valid Consent, Joanna Demaree-Cotton, Roseanna Sommers

Law & Economics Working Papers

Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry, Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found that specific and concrete incapacities reduced judgments of valid consent, but failing to exercise these specific capacities did not, even …


Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice And The Ethics Of Nudging, Jessica L. Roberts Apr 2018

Nudge-Proof: Distributive Justice And The Ethics Of Nudging, Jessica L. Roberts

Michigan Law Review

A review of Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of Behavioral Science.


Aborted Emotions: Regret, Relationality, And Regulation, Jody Lyneé Madeira Jan 2014

Aborted Emotions: Regret, Relationality, And Regulation, Jody Lyneé Madeira

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

Regret is a deeply contested emotion within abortion discourse. It is present in ways that we are both afraid of and afraid to talk about. Conventional pro-life and pro-choice narratives link regret to defective decision making. Both sides assert that the existence of regret reveals abortion’s harmfulness or harmlessness, generating a narrow focus on the maternal-fetal relationship and women’s “rights.” These incomplete, deeply flawed constructions mire discourse in a clash between regret and relief and exclude myriad relevant relationships. Moreover, they distort popular understandings of abortion that in turn influence women, creating cognitive dissonance and perhaps distress for those with …


After Autonomy, Carl E. Schneider Apr 2006

After Autonomy, Carl E. Schneider

Articles

Bioethicists today are like Bolsheviks on the death of Lenin. They have, rather to their surprise, won the day. Their principle of autonomy is dogma. Their era of charismatic leadership is over. Their work of Weberian rationalization, of institutionalizing principle and party, has begun. The liturgy is reverently recited, but the vitality of Lenin's "What Is To Be Done?" has yielded to the vacuity of Stalin's "The Foundations of Leninism." Effort once lavished on expounding ideology is now devoted to establishing associations, organizing degree programs, installing bioethicist commissars in every hospital, and staffing IRB soviets. Not-so-secret police prowl the libraries …


Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar Jan 2005

Credible Coercion, Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar

Articles

The ideal of individual freedom and autonomy requires that society provide relief against coercion. In the law, this requirement is often translated into rules that operate "postcoercion" to undo the legal consequences of acts and promises extracted under duress. This Article argues that these ex post antiduress measures, rather than helping the coerced party, might in fact hurt her. When coercion is credible-when a credible threat to inflict an even worse outcome underlies the surrender of the coerced party-ex post relief will only induce the strong party to execute the threatened outcome ex ante, without offering the choice to surrender, …


An Essay On The Piano, Law, And The Search For Women's Desire, Julia E. Hanigsberg Jan 1996

An Essay On The Piano, Law, And The Search For Women's Desire, Julia E. Hanigsberg

Michigan Journal of Gender & Law

The thesis of this essay is a simple one: to have a measure of control over her destiny, to have any choices, a woman must be a sexual agent, a subject of desire rather than an object. How can women exercise any autonomy in any other realms if in their most intimate lives they are unable to voice their desires? I do not mean to suggest that sexuality has unlimited explanatory power or that everything about women's domination can be explained by a rearticulation of desire. I do believe, however, that although the issue of sexuality is much discussed, feminist …