Law Commons^™

Taking Distribution Seriously, Robert C. Hockett

Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers

It is common for legal theorists and policy analysts to think and communicate mainly in maximizing terms. What is less common is for them to notice that each time we speak explicitly of socially maximizing one thing, we speak implicitly of distributing another thing and equalizing yet another thing. We also, moreover, effectively define ourselves and our fellow citizens by reference to that which we equalize; for it is in virtue of the latter that our social welfare formulations treat us as “counting” for purposes of socially aggregating and maximizing.

To attend systematically to the inter-translatability of maximization language on …

Press Freedom In Egypt, Amira Abdel Fattah Hussein

Archived Theses and Dissertations

In many countries, those who dare to criticize their governments, speak on behalf of a suppressed minority, or call for political or economic reforms are often portrayed as "traitors" trying to disseminate hatred and hostility and disturb national stability. In such cases, states that are often "equipped" with tailor-made national laws, remaining on alert to punish those who are courageous enough to challenge their governments can easily harass those who dare to defy the state's policies, measures or even orientation. As noted by James D. Seymour in his article Indices of Political Imprisonment, imprisonment is one of the most …

The Maine Women's Advocate (2008 - Summer), Maine Women's Lobby Staff

Maine Women's Publications - All

No abstract provided.

The Independence Of The Law Department, Jeffrey D. Friedlander

NYLS Law Review

No abstract provided.

Agenda Power In The Italian Chamber Of Deputies, 1988-2000, Gary W. Cox, William B. Heller, Mathew D. Mccubbins

Faculty Scholarship

We find strong evidence that governing coalitions in Italy exercise significant negative agenda powers. First, governing parties have a roll rate that is nearly zero, and their roll rate is lower than opposition parties’ roll rates, which average about 20% on all final passage votes. Second, we find that, controlling for distance from the floor median, opposition parties have higher roll rates than government parties. These results strongly suggest that governing parties in Italy are able to control the legislative agenda to their benefit. We also document significantly higher opposition roll rates on decree-conversion bills and budget bills that on …