Law Commons^™

The Temptation Of Executive Authority: How Increased Polarization And The Decline In Legislative Capacity Have Contributed To The Expansion Of Presidential Power, Edward G. Carmines, Matthew Folwer

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

This paper argues that our increasingly polarized politics has led to political stalemate and policy gridlock in Congress which, in turn, have contributed to a change in the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government; specifically, executive power has increased at the expense of a diminished legislature. The paper will trace the extent to which Congress has become increasingly polarized and how this increased polarization has reduced Congress's capability and productivity while simultaneously increasing policy gridlock resulting in the expansion of executive power (and judicial authority) relative to legislative authority

The Rise Of The Executive And The Post-Political Drift Of European Public Law, Marco Dani

Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies

Contemporary European public law is marked by the uneasy relationship between national constitutional democracies and the executive-based supranational governance of the European Union. Whereas constitutional democracy remains the dominant source of inspiration for European institutional imagination, the supranational executive has relentlessly expanded its scope and institutional culture to key policy fields at the core of national constitutional democracies. This article tracks the rise of the supranational executive by examining three relational paradigms developed between national constitutional democracies and the European Union in distinct phases of the European integration process (i.e., the complementarity paradigm in the foundational period; the competition paradigm …

Dictation And Delegation In Securities Regulation, Usha Rodrigues

Indiana Law Journal

When Congress undertakes major financial reform, either it dictates the precise con-tours of the law itself or it delegates the bulk of the rule making to an administrative agency. This choice has critical consequences. Making the law self-executing in federal legislation is swift, not subject to administrative tinkering, and less vulnerable than rule making to judicial second-guessing. Agency action is, in contrast, deliberate, subject to ongoing bureaucratic fiddling, and more vulnerable than statutes to judicial challenge.

This Article offers the first empirical analysis of the extent of congressional delegation in securities law from 1970 to the present day, examining nine …

A Taxonomy Of Independent Electoral Reapportionment Systems, James Ruley

Indiana Journal of Constitutional Design

This paper addresses a means of checking legislative gerrymandering, which I have called the Independent Electoral Reapportionment Commission (IERC). Its purpose is to prevent self-interested politicians from drawing biased constituency lines. While scholars have researched gerrymandering, few scholars have researched commissions designed to limit such gerrymandering, and no comprehensive work details the global means of accomplishing this goal.

Thus, the purpose of this paper is not to normatively prescribe the best practices for composing and empowering an IERC, but rather to descriptively show how different countries conduct this process. While Part II makes some determinations about which commissions may conceptually …

Confirm Myra Selby For The Seventh Circuit, Carl W. Tobias

Indiana Law Journal

This Article canvasses Myra Selby’s dynamic professional record, the federal judicial selection process under President Obama, and the Seventh Circuit. It ascertains that Selby is an exceptionally competent, mainstream prospect and that the appellate court requires all of its members to deliver justice. However, Republican senators did not collaborate, particularly after they had captured a Senate majority—a circumstance that this presidential election year aggravates. The last section, therefore, proffers recommendations for Selby’s prompt Senate consideration and confirmation.