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Full-Text Articles in Law
Managing Mass Tort Class Actions: Judicial Politics And Rulemaking In Three Acts, Toby S. Goldbach
Managing Mass Tort Class Actions: Judicial Politics And Rulemaking In Three Acts, Toby S. Goldbach
University of Miami Law Review
Judges take part in a variety of non-adjudicative tasks that shape the structure of litigation. In addition to their managerial functions, judges sit as administrative heads of court. They participate in civil justice reform projects and develop procedures for criminal and civil trials. What norms and principles ought to guide judges in this other work? In their casework we expect judges to be neutral and fair, setting aside politics and rationally following the law. Indeed, this article will demonstrate that there is good reason to insist on these qualities in both judges’ case-related and broader court-related reform activities. To test …
Texas: A Weak Governor State, Or Is It?, Ron Beal
Texas: A Weak Governor State, Or Is It?, Ron Beal
St. Mary's Law Journal
The current Texas Constitution was adopted in 1876 and was written after the Civil War and the Reconstruction Period when Federal troops occupied the State. The general perception is that the Federal troops used the Governor, in essence, to impose a form of dictatorship over the people. It was clearly the intent of the new constitution’s framers to create a very weak governor form of government in order to spread its powers to many independently elected officials. It provided that the state officers who were appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate were semi-independent from the Governor by …
Protecting The Individual Rights Of Nfl Players As Private Sector Employees, Derick Vranizan
Protecting The Individual Rights Of Nfl Players As Private Sector Employees, Derick Vranizan
Seattle Journal for Social Justice
No abstract provided.
Agency Rulemaking And Political Transitions, Anne Joseph O'Connell
Agency Rulemaking And Political Transitions, Anne Joseph O'Connell
Northwestern University Law Review
No abstract provided.
Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann
Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, Jack M. Beermann
Michigan Journal of Environmental & Administrative Law
There is a documented increase in the volume of regulatory activity during the last ninety days of presidential administrations when the President is a lame duck, having either been defeated in a bid for re-election or being at the end of the second term in office. This includes an increase in the number of final rules issued as compared to other periods. The phenomenon of late-term regulatory activity has been called “midnight regulation,” based on a comparison to the Cinderella story in which the magic wears off at the stroke of midnight. This Article looks closely at one species of …
Populism, Politics, And Procedure: The Saga Of Summary Judgment And The Rulemaking Process In California, Glenn S. Koppel
Populism, Politics, And Procedure: The Saga Of Summary Judgment And The Rulemaking Process In California, Glenn S. Koppel
Pepperdine Law Review
The California Constitution gives the primary power to promulgate rules of civil procedure for the state courts to the legislature and the people, leaving the state’s Judicial Council with residual, or secondary, authority to adopt rules of procedure and court administration “when and where the higher authority of the Legislature and the people has not been exercised.” This Article demonstrates how this legislative rulemaking process, referred to herein as “legislative primacy,” does not work because, as of the writing of this article in 1997, it produced ineffective statutory summary judgment law.
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Optimal Political Control Of The Bureaucracy, Matthew C. Stephenson
Michigan Law Review
It is widely believed that insulating an administrative agency from the influence of elected officials, whatever its other benefits orjustifications, reduces the agency's responsiveness to the preferences of political majorities. This Article argues, to the contrary, that a moderate degree of bureaucratic insulation from political control alleviates rather than exacerbates the countermajoritarian problems inherent in bureaucratic policymaking. An elected politician, though responsive to majoritarian preferences, will almost always deviate from the majority in one direction or the other Therefore, even if the average policy position of a given elected official tends to track the policy views of the median voter …